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Sacks and Silvera: A Return to Reason for Price Restraints

A RETURN TO REASON FOR PRICE RESTRAINTS
Ira S. Sacks*
Hillel R. Silvera**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The rule of law that declares resale price maintenance, or vertical
price fixing,' per se unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Ace
should be overturned in favor of the rule of reason.3 The Supreme Court
declared vertical price restraints per se unlawful over eighty years ago
based upon factual assumptions which were incorrect at the time and
upon economic doctrines which have long since been repudiated. Instead
of overturning the per se rule, the Court has artificially narrowed the
scope of so-called "price" restraints, and has expanded the range of socalled "non-price" restraints subject to the rule of reason. The result is
increasing incoherence and inconsistency in the antitrust law. The
struggle in the lower courts to avoid the per se rule and its often
inequitable results compounds this incoherence and renders the per se

Mr. Sacks is a partner at the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson.
** Mr. Silvera is an associate at the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson.
1. The terms "resale price maintenance," "vertical price fixing" and "vertical price restraints"
all refer to restraints of trade imposed by a supplier or manufacturer on a reseller which restrict or
control the price at which goods may be resold. Vertically imposed price restraints are distinguished
from vertically imposed restraints of trade that control other elements of trade, e.g., manufacturerimposed restrictions on its distributors concerning customers to whom they can sell or territories in
which they can sell.
Vertically imposed restraints of trade are distinguished from horizontally imposed restraints
of trade. Vertical restraints of trade are those effected between parties at different-but typically
adjacent-levels along the chain of distribution, e.g., a manufacturer and a distributor. Horizontal
restraints of trade are those effected between parties at the same level of distribution, e.g., competing
retailers.
This Article demonstrates that the current legal distinction between vertical price and nonprice restraints is indefensible and that all vertically imposed restraints of trade should be analyzed
under the rule of reason.
2. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
3. For a discussion of the rule of reason and per se rules, see infra part II.A-C.
*
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rule impotent as a viable rule of decision. The ultimate result of this state
of affairs is that the business community, and the practitioners to whom
it turns for advice, are left without clear guidance or meaningful
standards by which to pursue legitimate business goals without falling
into the trap of per se condemnation.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract,
combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."4
The decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting this provision have
consistently recognized that it was intended to prohibit only unreasonable
restraints of trade.' Whether particular conduct violates section 1 of the
Sherman Act typically is determined, therefore, on a case by case basis
where the trier of fact "'weighs all of the circumstances of a case in
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing
an unreasonable restraint on competition"--the rule of reason.6 Certain
categories of practices, however, have been conclusively presumed to
violate section 1 of the Act and are declared unlawful per se, without the
need for a case by case evaluation---the so called per se rule.7
Resale price maintenance has been held by the Supreme Court to be
perse violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act since 1911 8 The factual
assumptions and common law rule against restraints on alienation that
underlied the Court's condemnation of resale price maintenance,
however, probably made no sense in 1911 and surely is inconsistent with
modem antitrust jurisprudence which is based primarily on market impact
and economic effect. 9 It is widely recognized today that vertical
restraints of trade, including resale price maintenance, often have
significant procompetitive potential that can increase economic efficiency
and serve the public interest." The Supreme Court has implicitly

4. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
5. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723, cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1005 (1988) (restating well-settled principle of antitrust law); see also NCAA v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
6. Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 723 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
7. Id.; see also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
8. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-09
(1911).

9. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59.
10. See Michael L. Denger, VerticalPrice,Customerand TerritorialLimitations,in ANTITRUST
LAW 1995, at 508-09 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 7098, 1995).
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recognized this wisdom in a number of cases decided over the past
fifteen years but has refrained from overturning the per se rule against
resale price maintenance. Instead, the Supreme Court has strained to
narrow the scope of activities subject to theper se rule and to expand the
range of business practices subject to the rule of reason. All that is
presently left to the per se rule's condemnation of vertical practices is an
artificially and narrowly defined category of "price" restraints that is
unconnected to any relevant economic effect or competitive impact and
which does not distinguish legitimate procompetitive practices from the
most restrictive business practices. Ultimately, "out of the single term
'restraint of trade' a chronologically schizoid statute [has been created],
in which a 'rule of reason' evolves with new circumstances and new
wisdom, but a line of per se illegality remains forever fixed where it
was."" This renders the per se rule against resale price maintenance
ineffective as a viable rule of decision. It also makes the per se rule a
trap for the unwary or uncounseled executive.
The circuit courts have compounded this problem by struggling to
avoid illogical applications of the per se rule that would produce
inconsistent and inequitable results. In what are plainly judgment-driven
decisions, the courts have strained to distinguish indirect, yet overt, price
restrictions on distribution from resale price maintenance. They have also
relied on heightened evidentiary standards concerning the sufficiency of
evidence from which an inference of concerted action is allowed to avoid
per se condemnation of restraints of trade despite clear price motivations.
Most recently, the courts have relied on a new narrow definition of what
constitutes a "price" restraint in order to subject numerous price
restrictions to rule of reason analysis.'
As noted at the outset, the tortured treatment received by the per se
rule in the lower courts leaves the business community, and the
practitioners to whom it turns for advice, without any clear guidance or
meaningful standards by which to pursue their legitimate business goals.
Numerous legitimate business practices are often suggested by clients
who are prepared to act but fear that their conduct may be per se
unlawful. The current confusion in both the Supreme Court and the lower
courts-condemning vertical price restraints as per se unlawful, but
treating certain price restraints as non-price to avoid per se treatment of
procompetitive practices-has made it impossible to give clear guidance

11. Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 732.
12. See infra part III.
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to clients. This confusion has chilled businesses from engaging in
procompetitive practices. This confusion should come to an end.
This Article demonstrates that the solution to the problems outlined
above is to overturn the per se rule against resale price maintenance in
favor of the rule of reason. Part II traces and analyzes in detail the
Supreme Court's development and application of the per se rule against
vertical price restraints, demonstrates its inconsistency with modem
antitrust jurisprudence and highlights its incoherence. Part Ill examines
how this problem has been dealt with in the lower courts. Part IV
illustrates the difficulties and obstacles that the business community
currently encounters in pursuing its legitimate business goals while trying
to avoid the pitfall of per se condemnation and highlights why the only
workable solution is abandonment of the perse rule against vertical price
restraints.
II.

THE PER SE RULE IN THE SUPREME COURT:
BUSINESS ELECTRONICS

A.

FROM DR. MILES TO

Dr. Miles, Colgate and Colgate Revisited

The Supreme Court first declared resale price maintenance per se
unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act in 1911, in Dr Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 13 In Dr Miles, the plaintiff was
a drug and medicine manufacturer who brought suit against one of its
wholesale dealers, complaining that the dealer had interfered with certain
contractual relations between Dr. Miles and various other wholesale
dealers and retail vendors.' 4 The contracts at issue were a collection of
"Consignment" and "Retail Agency" contracts, between Dr. Miles and
over four hundred wholesale dealers and 25,000 retail vendors, which
gave Dr. Miles effective control over the prices at which its goods were
resold to the public. 5 The defendant dealer, John D. Park & Sons Co.,
countered by claiming that the contracts in question were invalid both at
common law and under the Sherman Act. 6 In its antitrust analysis, the
Supreme Court observed that Dr. Miles's activity was categorically
impermissible at early common law as an unlawful restraint on alien-

13. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).

14. See id. at 394-95.
15. Id. at 394.
16. See id. at 400.
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ation. 7 The Court concluded its analysis by characterizing the agreements as an unreasonable "system of interlocking restrictions"' 8
designed to "maintain prices ... and to prevent competition among those
who trade in [the medicines]."" Based on this conclusion, the Supreme
Court held that the agreements were "invalid both at common law and
under [section 1 of the Sherman Act]" and affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of Dr. Miles's complaint.2"
In language prescient of the proper analysis of vertical price
restraints, Justice Holmes dissented. He warned that there was insufficient
experience with vertical price restraints to condemn them without further
inquiry:
The sale to the retailers is made by the plaintiff, and the only question
is whether the law forbids a purchaser to contract with his vendor that
he will not sell below a certain price. This is the important question in
this case. I suppose that in the case of a single object such as a painting
or a statue the right of the artist to make such a stipulation hardly
would be denied. In other words, I suppose that the reason why the
contract is held bad is that it is part of a scheme embracing other
similar contracts each of which applies to a number of similar things,
with the object of fixing a general market price. This reason seems to
me inadequate in the case before the court. In the first place by a slight
change in the form of the contract the plaintiff can accomplish the
result in a way that would be beyond successful attack. If it should
make the retail dealers also agents in law as well as in name and retain
the title until the goods left their hands I cannot conceive that even the
present enthusiasm for regulating the prices to be charged by other
people would deny that the owner was acting within his rights. It seems
to me that this consideration by itself ought to give us pause.
But I go farther. There is no statute covering the case; there is no
body of precedent that by ineluctable logic requires the conclusion to
which the court has come. The conclusion is reached by extending a
certain conception of public policy to a new sphere. On such matters
we are in perilous country. I think that, at least, it is safe to say that the
most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own
business in their own way, unless the ground for interference is very
clear. What then is the ground upon which we interfere in the present

17. See id. at 404-08, cited in Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,733,
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
18. Dr.Ailes, 220 U.S. at 399.
19. Id. at 407.
20. Id. at 409.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

5

Hofstra
LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1996],[Vol.
Art.24:1069
3
HOFSTRA
REVIEW
case? Of course, it is not the interest of the producer. No one, I judge,
cares for that. It hardly can be the interest of subordinate vendors, as
there seems to be no particular reason for preferring them to the
originator and first vendor of the product. Perhaps it may be assumed
to be the interest of the consumers and the public. On that point I
confess that I am in a minority as to larger issues than are concerned
here. I think that we greatly exaggerate the value and importance to the
public of competition in the production or distribution of an article
(here it is only distribution), as fixing a fair price. What really fixes
that is the competition of conflicting desires. We, none of us, can have
as much as we want of all the things that we want. Therefore, we have
to choose. As soon as the price of something that we want goes above
the point at which we are willing to give up other things to have that,
we cease to buy it and buy something else. Of course, I am speaking
of things that we can get along without. There may be necessaries that
sooner or later must be dealt with like short rations in a shipwreck, but
they are not Dr. Miles's medicines. With regard to things like the latter
it seems to me that the point of most profitable returns marks the
equilibrium of social desires and determines the fair price in the only
sense in which I can find meaning in those words. The Dr. Miles
Medical Company knows better than we do what will enable it to do
the best business. We must assume its retail price to be reasonable, for
it is so alleged and the case is here on demurrer; so I see nothing to
warrant my assuming that the public will not be served best by the
company being allowed to carry out its plan. I cannot believe that in
the long run the public will profit by this court permitting knaves to cut
reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own and thus to
it is
impair, if not to destroy, the production and sale of articles which
2
assumed to be desirable that the public should be able to get. '
Despite Justice Holmes's prescience, since Dr. Miles, resale price
maintenance has been conclusively presumed to violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act as an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Just eight years later in United States v. Colgate & Co., 22 a
decision of broad antitrust significance, the Court took a half-step back
from its holding in Dr Miles--the first in a series of vacillations over the
scope of Dr. Miles's per se rule against resale price maintenance. In
Colgate, the defendant, Colgate & Co., was engaged in the manufacture
and sale of soap and toilet articles. The government's indictment charged
Colgate with violating section 1 of the Sherman Act under the per se rule

21. Id. at 410-12 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
22. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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of Dr.Miles by fixing the prices at which its products were resold to the
public.23 This was accomplished, as charged by the indictment, by
distributing mandatory price lists to dealers through notices stating that
no sales would be made to dealers who did not adhere to such prices,
and by investigating and suspending non-complying dealers.2 4 The
Supreme Court found, however, that the indictment failed to charge any
contract, combination or agreement between Colgate and any of its
distributors. The Court explained that the purpose of the Sherman Act is
to prohibit "contracts and combinations" that unduly interfere with free
trade, but that the Sherman Act "does not restrict the long recognized
right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
he will deal." 2 It followed that a manufacturer could unilaterally
announce a price policy and refuse to deal with any party who would not
comply, and remain free from section 1 scrutiny.26 Accordingly, the
Court reasoned that unilaterally imposed restraints of trade cannot violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
the government's complaint. 7
In order to understand the interaction of Dr.Miles and Colgate with
subsequent cases, it is important to remember that each case brought
under section 1 of the Sherman Act contains three basic elements: (1)
proof of concerted action between the defendant and some other party;
(2) proof showing the type of restrictive practice of which the plaintiff
complains; and (3) the resulting rule of decision, either the rule of reason
or a per se rule. The third element, the rule of decision, depends upon
the second element, the type of restrictive practice at issue. In many
cases brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the dispute focuses
upon the second and third elements, with the parties arguing over the
legal status of a given restrictive practice. For example, Dr Miles
focused on the third element, raising the issue of the legal status of resale
price maintenance under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court's decision
established the rule that resale price maintenance is perse unlawful under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.28 Colgate, however, focused on the first
element. The Supreme Court's decision there emphasized that concerted

23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 302-03.
See id. at 303.
Id. at 307.
See id.

27. See id. at 306-08.
28. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
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action is a required threshold element of any claim under section 1 of the
Sherman Act and explored the contours of the definition of concerted
action. 9 The ruling in Colgate--that the absence of concerted action
renders the per se rule of Dr.Miles inapplicable-necessarily limits the
scope of Dr. Miles by removing a broad range of activity from its
scrutiny. The extent to which Colgate limits the scope of Dr.Miles turns
on the question of what constitutes concerted action under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, a question with which courts have wrestled since
Colgate.
In a series of subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court responded
to Colgate by expanding the scope of activity from which an inference
of concerted action could be drawn, thereby expanding the scope of
activity subject to the per se rule of Dr.Miles and narrowing the scope
of Colgate's protection. In Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co.,30 the Supreme Court held that where a producer coerced
its customers to comply with its resale price policy, such coercion ran
afoul of the Sherman Act." An "agreement," in the common understanding of the word, was no longer necessary to create an unlawful
combination; "coercion" would now suffice. In United States v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co.,3 the Court held further that a conspiracy or
combination was achieved by the acquiescence of customers in a
producer's resale price policy coupled with their assistance in effectuating its purpose to maintain resale prices.33 That decision was totally
contrary to Colgate. The acquiescence of customers is an inherent
element in any successful unilaterally imposed resale price policy. The
Court's holding in Bausch & Lomb, therefore, was, at the very least, that
any affirmative assistance from one's customers converted otherwise
unilateral activity into concerted activity; at most, it sought to overrule
Colgate.
Further apparent, in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., " the
Court sounded the death knell for Colgate by limiting the scope of
Colgate's protection to no more than a simple refusal to deal with
3
customers who do not adhere to a seller's suggested resale prices. 5

29. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 304-06.
30. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).

31. See id. at 454-56.
32. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).

33. See id. at 723.
34. 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (Brennan, J.).
35. Id. at 43.
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From a lengthy discussion and analysis of prior case law, including
Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb, the Court found that concerted action
could be inferred from any affirmative action on the part of a seller that
went beyond the mere refusal to sell to customers who do not observe an
announced price policy.3 6 The majority in Parke,Davis expressly called
into question the continuing wisdom of the Colgate doctrine.37
B.

The Zenith of the Per Se Rule

In a line of decisions beginning in the late 1950s and continuing
through the late 1960s, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the
legal status of various types of restrictive business practices under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States,3" the Supreme Court reviewed Northern Pacific Railway's
"preferential routing" agreements. The preferential routing agreements
compelled grantees or lessees of land owned by Northern Pacific to use
Northern Pacific's railroad lines when shipping goods produced or
manufactured on the land.39 The government sued for a declaration that
the agreements were unlawful as unreasonable restraints of trade under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.4" The Supreme Court characterized the
routing agreements as "tying arrangements," in which a party agrees to
sell a product "on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different
(or tied) product."' The Court explained that tying arrangements were
per se unlawful "whenever a [seller] has sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the
market for the tied product."42 Finding that Northern Pacific had
sufficient economic power with respect to land to appreciably restrain
free competition in the shipping market,43 the Supreme Court held that
Northern Pacific's preferential routing agreements were per se unlawful

36. Id. In a vigorous dissent, however, Justice Harlan posited that Beech-Nut and Bausch &
Lomb did not limit Colgate,and argued that the majority in Parke, Davis was guilty of"introducing
a new narrowing concept into the Colgate doctrine." Id. at 52.

37. Id. at 44; see also id. at 49 (Stewart, J., concurring). For further discussion of cases dealing
with this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 65-87 (discussing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145 (1968)) and infra text accompanying notes 136-148 (discussing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)).
38. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).

39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 3-4.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 6.

43. Id. at 7.
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and affirmed summary judgment for the government.m
In Northern Pacific, the Supreme Court articulated a standard for
evaluating when a per se rule is the appropriate rule of decision. The
Court declared: "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use."45 This has become
the authoritative standard for per se condemnation. Since Northern
Pacific, restrictive business practices that have come before the Court
sometimes have been-and always should be-examined in light of this
standard.
That was the case in White Motor Co. v. United States,46 where the
Supreme Court addressed the antitrust status of certain exclusive territory
and customer agreements between a manufacturer and approximately 300
distributors and dealers. The agreements provided, inter alia, that each
distributor would have the exclusive right to sell trucks manufactured by
White Motor within a described territory, and that each distributor could
not sell to certain customers without White Motor's written permission.4 7 The government brought a civil action under section 1 of the
Sherman Act challenging the legality of these restrictive agreements.
The district court ruled that these restrictions were per se violations of
the Sherman Act and granted summary judgment to the government.4 9
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that vertical exclusive territory
and customer restrictions could not be per se unlawful since the Court
did "not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which
these arrangements emerge[d] to be certain [whether they stifled
competition]."5 Citing the standard articulated in Northern Pacific, the
Court explained that it needed to "know more.., about the actual
impact of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they have
such a 'pernicious effect on competition and lack . . .any redeeming

44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 12.
Id. at 5.
372 U.S. 253 (1963).
See id. at 255-56.

48. Id. at 255.
49. Id. at 256.

50. Id. at 263.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss4/3

10

1996]

TO REASON
SacksRETURN
and Silvera:
A Return to Reason for Price Restraints

virtue"' such that they should be condemned as per se violations of the
Sherman Act."
The Supreme Court's analysis of the territory and customer
restrictions in White Motor under the per se standard of Northern Pacific
is precisely the type of analysis that the Court should have performed at
some point in time with respect to resale price maintenance. The
Supreme Court declared resale price maintenance per se unlawful in
1911 without any analysis of the business reasons and economic effects
of such a practice. 2 And that conclusion has been repeatedly reiterated,
but never examined. By continuously presuming per se illegality, the
Supreme Court has failed to examine the "economic and business stuff'
out of which resale price maintenance emerges. Dr Miles and its
progeny have concerned themselves with none of the essential elements
of the Northern Pacific standard and, therefore, are wholly inadequate
authorities upon which to base any conclusions about resale price
maintenance. To be sure, "Dr Miles is not the model for the classification of new business arrangements. 5 3
The Supreme Court's willingness to resort to per se rules of
condemnation as an appropriate rule of decision for an increasing variety
of restrictive business practices reached its zenith in two notable
decisions in the late 1960s, both of which have since been repudiated. In
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.," the Supreme Court again
addressed the legal status of exclusive territory and customer agreements.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., a manufacturer of bicycles and bicycle parts,
distributed its products through agency and consignment agreements with
twenty-two wholesale distributors and by sale to wholesale distributors,
to each of whom it assigned specific territories and customers. 5 The
government challenged Schwinn's distribution practices under section 1
of the Sherman Act. The district court held that the agreements to divide
territories were per se violations of the Sherman Act with respect to
products sold to distributors, but not with respect to the agency and
consignment transactions. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that both
the agreements to divide territories and the customer restrictions were

51. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 5 (1958)).

52. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-09 (1911).
53. Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 728 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990).

54. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
55. Id. at 371.
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illegal. 6 "Under the Sherman Act," the Court concluded, "it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine
areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it."57 To allow such a practice
"would violate the ancient rule against restraints on alienation. 5 8 Thus,
the Court held that resale restraints on territories or customer selection
were per se unlawful.
Maintaining the lower court's distinction between sale and non-sale
transactions, however, the Supreme Court did not condemn the same
practices in the context of an agency or consignment agreement. The
Court reasoned that section 1 of the Sherman Act required a distinction
between situations where the manufacturer parted with title, dominion or
risk and situations where it retained ownership and risk of loss." The
Court observed that a per se rule against vertical territory and customer
restrictions in all contexts was far too inflexible and might hamper
competition.'
Such analysis, however, was "an abrupt and largely unexplained
departure" from the antitrust jurisprudence of Northern Pacificand White
Motor, stepping back into the common law rationale of Dr.Miles.6 The
Court based its decision on the common law rule against restraints on
alienation, in which the pivotal factor was the passage of title.62 There
was no analysis of the anticompetitive affect of Schwinn's practices, nor
any evaluation of any countervailing procompetitive merit, as required by
Northern Pacific. Indeed, only four years after White Motor, the
Court "announced its sweeping per se rule without even a reference to
[Northern63Pacific] and with no explanation of its sudden change in
position."

56. Id. at 378.
57. Id. at 379.

58. Id. at 380.
59. Id. at 378-79.
60. Id. at 379-80.
61. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 (1977). In the Schwinn
opinion, the Court purports to allow for White Motor's rule-of-reason analysis in cases where the
manufacturer retains ownership of the product. In his dissent, however, Justice Stewart correctly

argues that no previous decision of the Court justifies its decision, which instead, "completely
repudiates the only case in point, White Motor." Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 388-89
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
62. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52.
63. Id.at 51.
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Moreover, the Schwinn Court itself pointed out the irrationality of
per se condemnation, albeit supposedly in the context of agency and
consignment agreements:
On the other hand, as indicated in White Motor, we are not prepared to
introduce the inflexibility which a per se rule might bring if it were
applied to prohibit all vertical restrictions of territory and all franchising, in the sense of designating specified distributors and retailers as the
chosen instruments through which the manufacturer, retaining ownership of the goods, will distribute them to the public. Such a rule might
severely hamper smaller enterprises resorting to reasonable methods of
meeting the competition of giants and of merchandising through
independent dealers, and it might sharply accelerate the trend towards
vertical integration of the distribution process.
... Where the manufacturer retains title, dominion, and risk with
respect to the product and the position and function of the dealer in
question are, in fact, indistinguishable from those of an agent or
salesman of the manufacturer, it is only if the impact of the confinement is "unreasonably" restrictive of competition that a violation of § 1
results from such confinement, unencumbered by culpable price fixing.
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). As the District Court
found, Schwinn adopted the challenged distribution programs in a
competitive situation dominated by mass merchandisers which
command access to large-scale advertising and promotion, choice of
retail outlets, both owned and franchised, and adequate sources of
supply. It is not claimed that Schwinn's practices or other circumstances resulted in an inadequate competitive situation with respect to the
bicycle market; and there is nothing in this record-after elimination of
the price-fixing issue--to lead us to conclude that Schwinn's program
exceeded the limits reasonably necessary to meet the competitive
problems posed by its more powerful competitors. In these circumstances, the rule of reason is satisfied."
If the Court had paused to consider its own reasoning, it would have
retained the rule of reason for all of the challenged restraints since there
was no competitive significance to the retention (or release) of legal title.
Perhaps the most notable expansion of the per se doctrine is found
in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,65 where the Supreme Court reviewed a maximum price fixing arrangement combined with exclusive territories. In
Albrecht, the Herald Co. published a morning newspaper which was

64. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 379-81.
65. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
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distributed to homes in the St. Louis metropolitan area by independent
carriers.66 Each carrier distributed within an exclusive territory subject
to termination if the price charged to subscribers exceeded Herald's
suggested maximum.67 The plaintiff, Albrecht, a carrier for a home
delivery route, adhered to Herald's price policy for some time but then
began to raise his prices.6" In response, Herald hired Milne Circulation
Sales, Inc. to solicit residents on the route away from Albrecht, and then
gave a portion of the route to another carrier, George Kroner.69 Albrecht
then brought suit against Herald, challenging the maximum price
restriction under section 1 of the Sherman Act.7" The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment for Herald,
holding that Herald's conduct was "wholly unilateral and [that] there was
no restraint of trade."7' The Supreme Court reversed, disagreeing with
the court of appeals on both grounds, and held that Herald's hiring of
outside agents to take over Albrecht's delivery route, in response to
Albrecht's violation of Herald's price policy, constituted a combination
to fix resale prices 7 2-a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The Court concluded:
It is our view, therefore, that the combination formed by [Herald, Milne
and Kroner] in this case to force [Albrecht] to maintain a specified
price for the resale of the newspapers which he had purchased from
[Herald] constituted, without more, an illegal restraint of trade under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.73
The Supreme Court's ruling in Albrecht basically eliminated the
requirement of concerted action from section 1 of the Sherman Act. To
support its finding of concerted action, the Court relied on its decision
in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,74 where it held that an illegal
combination to fix prices results if a seller secures compliance to his
suggested resale prices by means that go beyond the "mere announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal."75 In Parke,Davis, a
manufacturer of pharmaceutical products specified resale prices for both
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 147.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 148.
Id.at 149.
Id.
Id. at 153.
362 U.S. 29 (1960).
Id. at 44.
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wholesalers and retailers and required wholesalers to refuse to deal with
non-complying retailers.76 The manufacturer was found to have created
a combination with retailers and wholesalers to maintain prices." In
Albrecht, the Court explained that in Parke, Davis "[t]he combination
with retailers arose because their acquiescence in the suggested prices
was secured by threats of termination; the combination with wholesalers
arose because they cooperated in terminating price-cutting retailers." s
The Court reasoned that if a combination arose under those circumstances, then a combination also arose between Herald, Milne and Kroner to
force Albrecht to conform to the advertised retail price.79
But if the Court were inclined to a rule of reason analysis, it would
have been easy to limit Parke, Davis and not expand it, as the Court
chose to do in Albrecht. In Parke, Davis, the manufacturer ultimately
sought to control the prices of the retailers with whom it had no direct
dealings, and the cooperation of the wholesalers was essential to effect
its policy and to police offending retailers.8" In Albrecht, however, there
was no intermediary between Herald and its carriers, and Herald required
no assistance to control the prices at which the distributors resold their
papers to subscribers nor to police offenders. Instead, Herald hired Milne
for its own convenience so that it could compete for Albrecht's
customers. 8' The Court suggests that Milne's and Kroner's awareness
of Herald's purpose to induce Albrecht's compliance was material, but
fails to explain why that might be so.82 The Court's reasoning fails to
draw a distinction between genuine concerted action and what can be
described, at worst, as two outsiders having knowledge of the purpose of
unilateral action. Moreover, the Court failed to even make note of the
Northern Pacific standard or to examine in light of that standard whether
vertically imposed price ceilings deserve per se treatment.
As if the Court's holding did not do sufficient violence to section 1
jurisprudence, in footnote six of the Albrecht opinion, the Court cites
three additional theories of concerted action that Albrecht might have

76. See id.at 31-33.

77. Id. at 45.
78. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
79. Id.
80. 362 U.S. at 45 ("Parke Davis used the refusal to deal with the wholesalers in order to elicit
their willingness to deny Parke Davis products to retailers and thereby help gain the retailers'
adherence to its suggested minimum retail prices.").

81. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 147.
82. See id. at 150.
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successfully asserted. 3 Each of these theories further eviscerates
whatever integrity was left of the Colgate doctrine after Parke, Davis.
First, footnote six suggests that Albrecht might have "claimed a
combination between [Herald] and himself... as of the day he
unwillingly complied with [Herald's price policy]. '84 Colgate ' concept
of a seller's unilateral action rests on the seller's right to announce a
price policy with the hope that dealers will comply. If unilateral action
becomes "concerted" and illegal, except if the buyer's compliance is
"willing," then any Colgate defense is subject to the fatal claim that the
aggrieved plaintiff's compliance was unwilling. It is one thing to suggest
that "coercion" converts unilateral conduct into concerted action; it is
quite another to hold that mere "unwilling" compliance on the part of the
customer converts a lawful price policy into an illegal conspiracy.
Consider the illogic of that result: Usually the hallmark of a conspiracy
is that the parties are willing participants; in Albrecht, willing acquiescence was the only way to escape the conspiracy.
Second, footnote six suggests that Albrecht might have claimed that
Herald combined with all other carriers because they acquiesced in
Herald's price policy.85 Once again, this theory eradicates any requirement to prove concerted action. According to this theory, if a supplier
announces a price policy and most customers acquiesce in it---even
willingly-that converts unilateral conduct into concerted action. Simply
put, if willing compliance by dealers is enough to establish concerted
action, then Colgate is meaningless.
Third, footnote six observes that an unlawful combination between
Herald and Albrecht's customers was not a frivolous claim.8 6 If this is
a valid claim, then any seller can be held liable for violating the Sherman
Act when a consumer chooses to make an economically advantageous
purchase at a lower price. This is a manifestly perverse result.
Once over the concerted action hurdle, the Albrecht Court faced the
issue of the legal status of maximum price fixing-i.e., price ceilings--under section 1 of the Sherman Act. In a brief analysis without
any measure of economic or competitive effects nor any reference to
Northern Pacific or its standard,87 the Court condemned maximum price
fixing as a per se violation of the Act, grouping such practices with

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 150 n.6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 152-54.
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minimum price fixing.88 Maximum price fixing, however, differs
significantly from minimum price fixing. In the latter, there is at least a
concern that consumers will be subject to price gouging. 9 A price
ceiling, however, when used in conjunction with an exclusive territory
arrangement, protects consumers from being gouged by dealers who
enjoy intrabrand "monopoly" power within their exclusive territories, and
may have important procompetitive effects on interbrand competition.
This critical distinction was the basis of the Albrecht court of appeals'
ruling.9" The Supreme Court rejected this distinction, however, by
suggesting that exclusive9 territories themselves were of dubious antitrust
validity under Schwinn. 1
C. GTE Sylvania: A Return to Reason
The pinnacle of the per se rule under Schwinn and Albrecht lasted
a decade, until the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Continental
TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,92 where the Court overruled Schwinn
and signaled a new approach to antitrust rules of decision "based upon
demonstrable economic effect rather than ... upon formalistic line
drawing."93 GTE Sylvania Inc. manufactured television sets and sold
them to both independent and company-owned distributors who in turn
resold them to a number of different retailers.94 Due to a decline in
market share, Sylvania intensively reviewed its marketing strategy and
decided to eliminate its wholesale distributors and to sell its televisions
directly to a small group of select franchisees. 95 To attract a reduced
number of retailers who would be more aggressive and competent,
"Sylvania limited the number of franchises granted for any given area
and required each franchisee to sell his Sylvania products only from the
location or locations at which he was franchised."96

88. See id. at 152.
89. See id. at 152-53.
90. Id. at 153.

91. Id. at 153-54. Now that Schwinn has been overruled, and in light of the Court's decisions
in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., see infra text accompanying notes 144-57, and Business
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., see infra text accompanying notes 174-84, it is unclear how much
validity is left to Albrecht's analysis. See Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d
698, 706-07 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); see also discussion infra part Il.
92. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
93. Id. at 59.
94. Id. at 38.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Continental T.V., Inc. was a franchised retailer operating out of San
Francisco and was one of Sylvania's most successful franchisees.9 7
After several business disputes between the parties, Sylvania terminated
Continental's franchise, and Sylvania's finance company filed a diversity
action against Continental to recover money owed and secured merchandise held by Continental.98 Continental brought a cross-claim against
Sylvania challenging the location restriction in the franchise agreement
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.99 Relying on Schwinn, the district
court held that Sylvania's restriction of the locations from which retailers
could sell Sylvania's products was a per se violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.t°° The Ninth Circuit reversed, distinguishing the territory
and customer restrictions in Schwinn from Sylvania's location restrictions
and holding that Sylvania's restrictions should be analyzed under the rule
of reason.'t t
The Supreme Court was "unable to find a principled basis for
distinguishing" Sylvania's distribution restrictions from the distribution
restrictions in Schwinn. °2 In a lengthy review and analysis of Schwinn,
the Court found Schwinn's distinction between sale and non-sale
transactions to be unrelated to any relevant economic or competitive
effects. 3 In analyzing the merits of such distribution restrictions, the
Court observed that they have significant procompetitive potential.'
The Court found, therefore, that Schwinn 's per se rule was inconsistent
with Northern Pacific's per se standard-which applies a per se rule
only to restraints that are likely to have a "'pernicious effect on competition'
or "'lack ...any redeeming virtue."" '
Accordingly, the
Supreme Court overruled Schwinn and held that vertical
distribution
6
restraints should be analyzed under the rule of reason.'
Indeed, the Court's sweep was so broad as to suggest that all

97. Id. at 39.

98. See id. at 39-40.
99. Id. at 40. Although Sylvania originally contended that its policy was unilaterally enforced,

it ultimately conceded that "its location restriction involved understandings or agreements with [its]
retailers." Id. at 40 n.8.
100. Id. at 40-41.
101. Id. at 41.
102. Id. at 46.

103. Id. at 56.
104. Id. at 46.
105. Id. at 58 (alteration in original) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I,

5 (1958)).
106. Id. at 57-59.
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vertical restraints would be subject to rule-of-reason analysis. As the
Court concluded:
Accordingly, we conclude that the per se rule stated in Schwinn must
be overruled. In so holding we do not foreclose the possibility that
particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se
prohibition under Northern Pac. R. Co. But we do make clear that
departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demoneffect rather than-as in Schwinn-upon formalistic
strable economic
107
line drawing.

At the heart of the Supreme Court's decision in GTE Sylvania lies
its attention to both intrabrand and interbrand competition and its
recognition that vertical restraints of trade have different effects in each
area of competition. As the opinion explains, "[t]he market impact of
vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand
competition."'0 8 On the one hand, "[v]ertical restrictions reduce
intrabrand competition by limiting the number of [competing] sellers of
a particular product."' 9 This can be the result, for example, of territory
or location restrictions. On the other hand, such restrictions "promote
interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain
efficiencies in the distribution of his products."" 0° New manufacturers
entering the market can use such restrictions to induce distributors and
retailers to make the capital and labor investments often required to
introduce a new product."' In addition, distribution restrictions can
help established manufacturers overcome the "free-rider" effect."'
Moreover, the Court in GTE Sylvania recognized that robust interbrand
competition provides important checks on the exploitation of intrabrand
market power because of customers' ability to substitute a competing

107. Id. at 58-59 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 51-52 (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 54.

110. Id.
at55.
111. Id.
112. Id. The "free rider" effect arises where a dealer who offered pre-sale services could then
be undersold by competing dealers offering no (or fewer) services. A potential customer could take
advantage of the first dealer's services and then make his purchase with the underselling dealer. Such
market imperfection is referred to as the "free-rider" effect. The price-cutting dealer who offers few
or no services free-rides on the full service dealer's provision of such services. See Richard A.
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
HorizontalMerger and PotentialCompetition Decisions, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 282, 285 (1975).
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brand of the same product." 3 Finally, the Court counseled that, in
balancing the net effect of these two conflicting market impacts, the
promotion of interbrand competition is to be accorded the greatest weight
since "[i]nterbrand competition ...is the primary concern of antitrust
law."' 14 Reconciling those competing effects necessarily led to the
Court's conclusion that antitrust plaintiffs should be required to prove
that such restrictions are unreasonably anticompetitive on balance in each
situation where they are employed. Any presumption of per se illegality
is inappropriate." 5
The Supreme Court noted that its holding in GTE Sylvania was
limited to non-price vertical restrictions, indicating that the "per se
illegality of price restrictions has been established firmly for many years
and involves significantly different questions of analysis and policy.""' 6
The distinctions relied on by the Court, however, are insufficient to
justify the disparate treatment of vertical price and non-price restrictions.
The leading authority cited by the Court to support its distinction
between price and non-price restrictions wrote that "industry-wide resale
price maintenance might facilitate [horizontal] cartelizing" at the
17
manufacturer level, an undisputed per se violation of the Act."
Although industry-wide resale price maintenance may theoretically be
manipulated to facilitate such a horizontal cartel, it has never been found
to have actually done so. The Court has held, both before and since, that
per se rules should be based upon prior experience that reveals a given
restrictive practice to be always or almost always anticompetitive, not on
theoretical speculation." 8

113. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55. This analysis is similar to Justice Holmes's observations
in his dissent in Dr. Miles. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,
409-13 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying note 21.
114. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
115. See id. at 58-59. On remand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Sylvania's
restrictions were reasonable, holding that "[tihe restraint was likely to promote interbrand
competition given the market structure in the television manufacturing industry." Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 1982).
116. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
117. Posner, supra note 112, at 294 (emphasis added), cited in GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51
n. 18. It is interesting to note that whereas Judge Posner did point out this distinction, he is among
the leading critics of the Court's maintenance of the distinction between price and non-price vertical
restrictions. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution:Per Se Legality, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 6, 8-10 (1981).
118. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-70

(1992); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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Moreover, certain non-price restrictions, such as exclusive territories,
can be similarly manipulated to produce the same effect and yet they are
analyzed under the rule of reason." 9 In addition, an industry-wide
horizontal cartel would be itself unlawful perse; and its existence would
require little investigation to discover. 2 '
Indeed, the market impact and economic effect of vertical price and
non-price restrictions are similar. As Justice White observed in his
concurrence in GTE Sylvania, any argument that can be made on behalf
of non-price restrictions can also be made on behalf of price restrictions.' For example, resale price maintenance may be the only
practical method of overcoming the free-rider problem where effective
retail distribution requires that dealers be located close to one another.' 22 Moreover, both price and non-price restrictions can have an
impact on price. For example, GTE Sylvania squarely holds that it is not
per se unlawful for a manufacturer to require its distributors to sell only
from a particular location-a "non-price" restriction. Through judicious
spacing of such distributors, however, a manufacturer can effectively
limit price competition among them."2 Given the similar effects of
vertical price and non-price restrictions, the Court's sanction of the rule
of reason for non-price restrictions necessarily calls into question the per
se rule against price restrictions.124 Since many scholars have observed

119. See Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1977).
120. This point was argued by the Solicitor General (by brief only) and several other amici in
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7 (1984), infra text accompanying
notes 144-57.
121. See 433 U.S. at 69-70 (citing Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 391-464 (1966); Posner, supra note
112, at 292-93).
122. Posner, supra note 119, at 9.
123. Id. at 11-12.
124. See 433 U.S. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
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that all vertical restrictions of trade are, as a rule, "beneficial to
consumers and ought not be condemned lightly or ever,""2 that
analysis should be applied to vertical price restraints as well.
D. Analysis of PriceRestraints After GTE Sylvania
While GTE Sylvania is considered a non-price case, since then the
Supreme Court has shown greater reliance on the rule of reason to
analyze new business practices with overt restrictions on price; it has
refused, however, to totally jettison the per se rule against vertical price
restraints. For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 2 6 the Court
analyzed under the rule of reason the NCAA's restrictive practices with
respect to the televising of college football games. In 1981, the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") adopted a plan for the
televising of the football games of its member institutions for the 198285 seasons. 127 The plan placed a ceiling on the total number of games
that could be televised and the number of games that each member
institution could televise. 28 In separate agreements with each of the
carrying broadcast networks--the American Broadcasting Company
("ABC") and the Columbia Broadcasting System ("CBS")-the NCAA
compensagranted the right to telecast games for a "minimum aggregate
29
schools.
member
participating
the
to
tion" payable
Some time before, five of the major conferences and major footballplaying institutions within the NCAA organized the College Football

125. Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc., v. American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 728 (7th Cir.
1986) (citing Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 171;
Hery N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade As ContractualIntegration:A
Synthesis ofRelational ContractingTheory, Transaction-CostEconomics, and OrganizationTheory,
32 EMORY L.J. 1009 (1983); George A. Hay, Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 418 (1985); Wesley J. Liebeler, 1983 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments: The
Distinction Between Price and Nonprice DistributionRestrictions, 31 UCLA L. REV. 384 (1983);
Posner, supra note 119, at 6; Lester G. Telser, Why Should ManufacturersWant FairTrade?, 3 J.L.
& EcON. 86 (1960), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990)); see also GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 69
concurring); ROBERT H. BOIK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 280-98 (1978); Posner, supra
(White, J.,
note 112, at 292-93. But see William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fiing, Vertical Market
Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985) (questioning Bork's
identification of manufacturers' interests with those of consumers); John J. Flynn & James F.
Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of
NeoclassicalEconomic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125
(1987).
126. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
127. Id. at 91.
128. Id. at 92-93.
129. Id. at 92.
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Association ("CFA") to promote the special interests of major footballplaying institutions within the NCAA. 130 Claiming that they should
have a greater voice in the formulation of football television policy than
the NCAA plan allowed, the CFA negotiated a separate contract with the
third national broadcasting network, the National Broadcasting Company
("NBC"). 3 The contract allowed for a more liberal number of televised games and "would have increased the overall revenues" to CFA
members.'32 Respondents Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia were
members of the CFA' 3 In response to the threat of disciplinary action
by the NCAA against any CFA member that complied with the CFANBC contract, the respondents brought an action challenging the NCAA
plan under section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 34 The district court held that
the NCAA plan violated the Sherman Act, 135 and the Tenth Circuit
NCAA television plan constituted price fixing
affirmed, holding that the
36
se.1
per
illegal
was
and
When reviewing the case, the Supreme Court characterized the
NCAA plan as horizontal price fixing because it precluded any price
negotiation between broadcasters and institutions and as a limitation on
output, because it limited the number of televised games.'37 Despite the
fact that such horizontal price fixing and output limitations are ordinarily
condemned as per se unlawful, 3 ' the Court decided that it would be
inappropriate to apply a per se rule in this case. 139 The Court observed
that the nature of televised college football was such that some measure
of horizontal restraint was necessary if televised college football was to
be available at all, since the organization of any league sport necessarily
involves horizontal collusion. 4 ' The Court decided, therefore, that the
rule of reason was the appropriate rule of decision. This "victory" for the
NCAA plan was short-lived; applying the rule of reason, the Court found
that the NCAA's limitation of output, preclusion of price negotiation, and
unresponsiveness to viewer choice imposed an unreasonable restraint on
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
at 100.
139.
140.

Id. at 89.
Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 95.
See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 1983).
See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99-100.
Horizontal price fixing is "perhaps the paradigm of an unreasonable restraint of trade." Id.
Id.
Id. at 101 (citing Bork, supra note 125, at 278); see also id. at 117.
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competition and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.' '
The Supreme Court's rejection of a per se rule in favor of the rule
of reason for an outright horizontal price restriction in NCAA further calls
into question the Court's refusal to extend the rule of reason vertical
price restrictions. Moreover, it further compounds the doctrinal inconsistency in the disparate treatment of price and non-price distribution
restrictions. In NCAA, the Court reasoned that since the very organization
of a league sport involves some measure of horizontal collusion (and
clearly does not automatically run afoul of the antitrust laws), it was
appropriate to analyze under the rule of reason a league plan for the
televising of its games. 42 In other words, the Court recognized that
such a plan may be procompetitive on balance despite its obvious
anticompetitive restrictive features, and this warranted more probing
analysis than a per se rule allows. That is the same reasoning the Court
used in GTE Sylvania to justify its decision to apply the rule of reason
to vertical non-price restrictions.14 1 It recognized that vertical restraints
can be procompetitive on balance and reasoned that those procompetitive
effects must be considered and balanced against its anticompetitive
features, and that this warranted more probing analysis than a per se rule
allows. However, if consideration of countervailing procompetitive
effects was sufficient to warrant rule of reason analysis for a horizontal
price restriction in NCAA, there is no principled basis for rejecting the
rule of reason with respect to vertical price restraints. Instead of
confronting this inconsistency directly and overturning the per se rule
against vertical price restraints, the Supreme Court has chosen to narrow
the application of the per se rule in subsequent decisions by revitalizing
the concerted action requirement and narrowing the class of "price"
restrictions subject to per se condemnation.
In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,'" the Supreme
Court clarified-and perhaps raised--4he level of proof from which an
allowable inference of concerted action could be made, effectively
resurrecting and re-invigorating Colgate.'4 5 Monsanto Company was a
manufacturer of agricultural herbicides. 4 6 Spray-Rite Service Corporation was a discount distributor of agricultural chemicals and an autho-

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See id. at 103-13, 120.
Id. at 101.
See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55-57 (1977).
465 U.S. 752 (1984).
See id. at 763-64; see also United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1919).
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 755.
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rized distributor of Monsanto herbicides from 1957 to 1968. In 1967,
Monsanto announced that it would appoint distributors for one-year terms
14 7
and would renew distributorships only according to specific criteria.
In 1968, Monsanto declined to renew Spray-Rite's distributorship. 4
Spray-Rite brought an action under section 1 of the Sherman Act alleging
that Monsanto and certain of its other distributors conspired to fix the
resale prices of Monsanto herbicides and that Spray-Rite was terminated
pursuant to this conspiracy for its price cutting practices.' 49 Monsanto
denied engaging in any resale price maintenance scheme and contended
that the termination of Spray-Rite's distributorship was a unilateral act
failure to satisfy Monsanto's announced
prompted by Spray-Rite's
15
distributorship criteria. 1
At trial, the jury returned a verdict for Spray-Rite upon which the
district court entered judgment. 5' The Seventh Circuit affirmed,
holding in substance that an antitrust plaintiff can survive a motion for
a directed verdict if it shows that a manufacturer terminated a price
cutting distributor in response to or following complaints by other
distributors.'52 The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals's
formulation of the level of proof required to submit a distributortermination case to the jury and concluded that "something more than
evidence of complaints" is required. 53 The Court held that "[t]here
must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and non-terminated distributors were acting independently."'"
The analytic significance of Monsanto is that it expands the
previously narrowed scope of the Colgate doctrine in the dealertermination context-perhaps the most common context in which
allegations of resale price maintenance arise. Monsanto provides an
enlarged Colgate safe-harbor within which to shield resale price
maintenance from per se condemnation under Dr Miles. Instead of
directly protecting resale price maintenance from unwarranted per se
condemnation by casting aside the per se rule in favor of the rule of
reason, the Court indirectly limited the per se rule by expanding the

147.

Id. at 756.

148. Id. at 757.
149. Id.
150. Id.

151.
152.
153.
set forth
154.

Id. at 757-58.
Id. at 758-59.
Id. at 764; see also id.at 759 (explaining that, even though the Court rejected the standard
by the court of appeals, the judgment was affirmed under a new standard).
Id. at 764.
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scope of exempt "unilateral" activity."' 5
In the specific instance of Monsanto, the victory for the defendant
was short-lived; the Court found that even under this enhanced standard,
there was sufficient evidence of concerted action and affirmed the
decision of the court of appeals. 5 6 However, many cases before
Monsanto that would have been submitted to the jury under a per se
theory are now dismissed on a defendant manufacturer's motion for
summary judgment. The motion simply recites that summary judgment
should be granted because the terminated dealer has produced nothing
more than evidence of non-terminated dealers' complaints and/or has
failed to produce any evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that
the manufacturer was acting independently in terminating the complainant. Indeed, Monsanto has left a wake of such summary judgment
dismissals in its path. 5 7 Thus, the real significance of Monsanto is that
it has freed an entire category of vertical price restraints-dealerterminations following other dealers' price complaints-from automatic
per se condemnation.
The Supreme Court has also avoided application of per se rules of
illegality by artificially narrowing the scope of restrictions that are
classified as "price" restrictions. For example, BroadcastMusic, Inc. v.
Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc.,'58 followed GTE Sylvania by only
two years and raised the issue of whether certain horizontal agreements
concerning the price of licensed copyrighted musical compositions
constituted illegal per se price fixing in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 59 Petitioners Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI") and the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP")
were organizations that operated as "clearing-houses" for owners and
users of copyrighted musical compositions t 0 They issued licenses to
users and remitted royalties to owners.1 6 Both organizations operated
primarily through blanket licenses which, for a fixed fee, gave licensees
in the
the unlimited right to perform any and all of the compositions
62
issuing organization's portfolio for a period of time.

155. See id. at 762.
156.
157.
F.2d 801
158.
159.

See id. at 765, 768.
See, e.g., Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 878
(4th Cir. 1989); see also infra note 264.
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
Id. at 4.

160. See id. at 5.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Respondent Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. ("CBS") was one
of the petitioners' largest licensees, holding blanket licenses from both
organizations. 163 CBS filed a complaint against ASCAP and BMI
alleging, inter alia, that the blanket license was a form of price fixing,
illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act."6 The district court
rejected this claim and dismissed the complaint. 6 The Second Circuit
reversed the district court's judgment and held that the blanket license
was a form of price fixing, illegal per se under the Sherman Act."6
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals but
chose a different formulation that recognized that the price restraint
involved warranted rule-of-reason analysis. 67
Instead of labeling the blanket licenses as simple price fixing, the
Court first looked at the nature of the blanket licenses, warning that
"easy labels do not always supply ready answers."' 68 In so doing, the
Court noted the usefulness ofper se rules for horizontal price restraints:
In construing and applying the Sherman Act's ban against
contracts, conspiracies, and combinations in restraint of trade, the Court
has held that certain agreements or practices are so "plainly
anticompetitive," National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977), and so often "lack ...any
redeeming virtue," Northern Pac.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958), that they are conclusively presumed illegal without further
examination under the rule of reason generally applied in Sherman Act
cases. This per se rule is a valid and useful tool of antitrust policy and
enforcement. And agreements among competitors to fix prices on their
activities that
individual goods or services are among those concerted
169
the Court has held to be within the per se category.
The Court then set upon the task of determining whether the blanket
license deserved per se treatment by looking at the likely effects of the
pricing practice under the test of Northern Pacific:
To the Court of Appeals and CBS, the blanket license involves
"price fixing" in the literal sense: the composers and publishing houses

163. Id. at 4-5.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 6.
See id.
See id. at 6-7.
See id.
at 24-25.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7-8 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
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have joined together into an organization that sets its price for the
blanket license it sells. But this is not a question simply of determining
whether two or more potential competitors have literally "fixed" a
"price." As generaly used in the antitrust field, "price fixing" is a
short-hand way of describing certain categories of business behavior to
which the per se rule has been held applicable. The Court of Appeals'
literal approach does not alone establish that this particular practice is
one of those types or that it is "plainly anticompetitive" and very likely
without "redeeming virtue." Literalness is overly simplistic and often
overbroad. When two partners set the price of their goods or services
they are literally "price fixing," but they are not per se in violation of
the Sherman Act. Thus, it is necessary to characterize the challenged
conduct as falling within or without that category of behavior to which
we apply the label "per se price fixing." That will often, but not
always, be a simple matter.
Consequently, as we recognized in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-608 (1972), "[i]t is only after considerable
experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them
as per se violations. .

. ."

We have never examined a practice like this

one before; indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that "[i]n dealing
with performing rights in the music industry we confront conditions
both in copyright law and in antitrust law which are sui generis." And
though there has been rather intensive antitrust scrutiny of ASCAP and
its blanket licenses, that experience hardly counsels that we should
outlaw the blanket license as a per se restraint of trade. 70
After examining nearly thirty years of market experience with
blanket licenses and the impact of copyright laws in this area, the Court
concluded that the "blanket license ...is not a 'naked restrain[t] of trade
with no purpose except stifling of competition,' but rather accompanies
the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use."'' Further noting the potential procompetitive
effects of blanket licenses and the need for such licenses, the Court
reversed the court of appeals and directed the application of the rule of
reason on remand.'72
The Court gave further guidance on the scope ofper se price fixing
analysis:
Finally, we have some doubt-enough to counsel against
170. Id. at 8-10 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
171. Id. at 20 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
172. See id. at 20-25.
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application of the per se rule-about the extent to which this practice
threatens the "central nervous system of the economy," United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940), that is,
competitive pricing as the free market's means of allocating resources.
Not all arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have
an impact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even
unreasonable restraints. Mergers among competitors eliminate competition, including price competition, but they are not per se illegal, and
many of them withstand attack under any existing antitrust standard.
Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually
unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on
price is necessary to market the product at all.
In BM, the Supreme Court avoided applying a per se rule to a
horizontal price restraint by effectively labelling the price restraint at
issue a non-price restraint. This example was followed nine years later
in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 74 where the
Court trivialized the per se rule against resale price maintenance in the
dealer-termination context by adopting an artificially narrow definition
of "price" restriction. There, Business Electronics Corp. and Hartwell
were both authorized dealers in the Houston area of calculators
manufactured by Sharp Electronics Corp. 7 s The case involved the notuncommon situation where Sharp terminated Business Electronics after
complaints by Hartwell concerning Business Electronics' discount pricing
practices.' 7 6 Business Electronics brought an action against Sharp under
section 1 of the Sherman Act alleging that Sharp and Hartwell conspired
to fix the resale prices of Sharp products and that Business Electronics
was terminated pursuant to this conspiracy-if established, a77 classic
vertical price fixing conspiracy per se unlawful under the Act.1
Following a trial in which the case was submitted to the jury on a
per se theory, the jury concluded that there was an agreement between
Sharp and Hartwell to terminate Business Electronics because of its price
cutting. 7 The jury awarded $600,000 in damages and the district court
entered judgment for Business Electronics for treble damages plus
attorney's fees. 7 9 The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new

173. Id. at 23.

174. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
175. Id. at 721.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 721-22.
Id. at 722.
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trial, holding that the termination of Business Electronics was not per se
illegal because Hartwell, the remaining dealer, did not 'expressly or
impliedly agree to set its prices' at some price or price level following
the termination."'0 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals and held that a manufacturer's termination of a price
cutting dealer upon the complaint of another dealer is not subject to per
se condemnation as price fixing unless there is an agreement between the
manufacturer and the complaining dealer concerning post-termination
price or price levels.'
Similar to Bk/, the principal focus of the Court's analysis in
Business Electronicsinvolved whether an agreement to terminate a price
cutting dealer should be classified as a price or non-price restraint. The
Court's conclusion was that, in general, such a restraint should not be
classified as a price restraint. The Court engaged in somewhat tortured
reasoning, however, to explain why an agreement between a manufacturer and a non-terminated dealer to terminate another dealer for price
cutting did not amount to a vertical price fixing conspiracy. This was
accomplished by narrowing the definition of price fixing to apply only
to situations where there is an express or implied agreement on a future
price or price level. 8 2 Such an express or implied agreement between
a manufacturer and a non-terminated dealer is very rare, and even where
such an agreement exists it presents a formidable evidentiary obstacle for
the terminated dealer. The jurisprudential impact of the Court's narrow
definition of a "price" restraint is to virtually eliminate application of the
per se rule in the dealer complaint context, and to substantially diminish
the ability of a terminated dealer to establish an illegal conspiracy subject
to per se treatment under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The practical impact on suppliers, however, is to leave matters
unsettled. How is a supplier supposed to determine whether a dealer's
complaint and its action will be found by a jury to set a price or price
level? How is a supplier to evaluate whether Business Electronics extends
to resale price maintenance policies-which set prices-or applies just
to dealer complaints? The proper result would have been to jettison the
per se rule as applied to vertical price restraints. It is mystifying why the
Court did not do so.
Indeed, the Court's opinion in Business Electronics, written by

180. Id. (quoting Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1218 (5th Cir.
1986)).
181. Id. at 735-36.
182. Id.
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Justice Scalia, indicates that the Court was quite aware that all of the
justifications offered in GTE Sylvania to subject vertical non-price
restrictions to the rule of reason apply equally to resale price maintenance. Moreover, Justice Scalia cites the proposition-originally cited in
GTE Sylvania-that resale price maintenance can be used to facilitate
cartelizing at the manufacturer level as the only distinction between
vertical price and non-price restraints,'83 but then goes on to explain
that "[c]artels are neither easy to form nor easy to maintain."'' " Nevertheless, the Court declined to confront directly the difficult issue of the
per se rule's obsolescence in the distribution context. Instead, it chose to
side-step the confrontation between settled law and manifest reality, and
to resolve the dispute by artificially narrowing the definition of vertical
price fixing.
The key area of vertical restraints still subject to the per se rule is
resale price maintenance policies, an area that has haunted the Court and
the business community alike, with no clear rule of decision through
Colgate; Bausch & Lomb; Parke, Davis; and Albrecht. It is long since
time to tell businesses that the use of resale price maintenance-an
important marketing tool-will be judged under the rule of reason,
without being subject to per se condemnation because of vague concepts
such as "coercion," "unwilling acquiescence" or "compliance by most
dealers." Absent monopoly power, the decision of a supplier to use a
resale price maintenance policy is often a rational procompetitive choice,
designed to prevent free-riding and to maintain the good will and value
of its brand. It should be tested and analyzed under the rule of reason. To
be sure, sometimes a resale price maintenance policy-when coupled
with other vertical restraints and market power--may run afoul of the
rule of reason. That is no excuse to throw the baby out with the bath
water, however, and continue the use of per se labels where they are not
warranted.
The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that the per se rule
against resale price maintenance has outlived its usefulness, and Business
Electronics relegates the rule in the dealer-termination context to the
narrow category of vertical restrictions where there is an agreement on
price or price levels. The presence or absence of such agreements,
however, like the distinction in Schwinn between sale and non-sale
transactions, is wholly divorced from any relevant economic impact that

183. See id. at 725.
184. Id. at 727.
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a given distribution restriction might have. In view of the Court's
implicit recognition that the termination of price-cutting dealers does not
deserve perse treatment, the Court's backhanded method of dealing with
the per se rule's obsolescence in the area of vertical price restraints
renders it nothing more than a useless trap for the unwary and
uncounseled.
Since GTE Sylvania, courts and scholars alike have criticized the
difference in treatment between price and non-price restraints. They have
also recognized the irrationality of preserving a per se rule against
vertical price restrictions. The circuit courts of appeals have struggled to
avoid this irrational rule and its potentially inequitable results. They have
strained to distinguish overt price restrictions from the resale price
maintenance formally condemned by the per se rule, and have relied on
the Supreme Court's heightened evidentiary standards with respect to
concerted action, and the Court's new and artificially narrow definition
of a "price" restraint, in order to subject flagrant price restrictions to the
rule of reason.
It is now appropriate to turn to the tortured treatment that the per
se rule against vertical price restraints has received in the lower courts
to shed some light on how the Supreme Court decisions analyzed in this
section have been received and applied, and to understand more
thoroughly how the per se rule currently affects various business
litigants.
H.

THE PER SE RULE IN THE LOWER COURTS

Recall that in GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court overruled the per
se rule of Schwinn and held that all vertical non-price restrictions should
be analyzed under the rule of reason. 85 The Court noted in GTE
Sylvania that Schwinn and its distinction between sale and non-sale
transactions had been referred to as "'an exercise in barren formalism,'.. 6 unrelated to any relevant economic impact and that many
lower courts had "'struggled to distinguish or limit Schwinn in ways that
[were] a tribute to judicial ingenuity."" 87 In reversing Schwinn's nonmarket based formalism, the Court required departure from the rule of

185. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
186. Id. at 48 n.13 (quoting Donald I. Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From
White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST LJ. 537, 537 (1975)).
187. Id. at 48 n.14 (quoting Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 243, 272 (1975)).
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reason to be based upon "demonstrable economic effect rather
than... upon formalistic line drawing." ' However, the Supreme
Court drew a formalistic line of its own in GTE Sylvania when it
preserved the per se illegality of vertical price restrictions.8I 9 The
distinction between vertical price and non-price restrictions is 'artificial
and unresponsive to the competitive needs of the real world,' '...and
has little basis in "demonstrable economic effect."'' Consequently, in
the years since GTE Sylvania, the lower courts have reacted to the per
se rule against vertical price restrictions as they did previously to
Schwinn, struggling to avoid it with equal judicial ingenuity. In this
section, we will analyze several of the more illustrative and noteworthy
efforts of these courts to avoid the per se rule and to treat overt price
restrictions under the rule of reason.
192
In Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc.,
one of the first lower court cases decided under GTE Sylvania, the First
Circuit avoided the per se rule by ignoring the distinction between price
and non-price restrictions and focusing instead on market impact. The
defendant, Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., was an importer and
distributor of scientific equipment. 93 Wild Heerbrugg distributed its
products through various dealers to whom it assigned exclusive sales
territories."' Within these territories, Wild Heerbrugg imposed no
restrictions upon its dealers' sales activities. 9 For extra-territorial
sales, however, Wild Heerbrugg required its dealers to sell at no less than
a suggested list price. The plaintiff, Eastern Scientific Co., was a
scientific instruments dealer that marketed Wild Heerbrugg products from
1961 through 1972 in its assigned territory of Rhode Island. Disagreements then arose between Wild Heerbrugg and Eastern Scientific as to
whether Eastern Scientific could sell below list price outside of Rhode
Island. These disagreements ultimately led Wild Heerbrugg to terminate
its business relationship with Eastern Scientific. In response, Eastern
Scientific brought suit against Wild Heerbrugg, challenging its exclusive
territory and resale price maintenance policies under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The district court found the policies to be per se unlawful
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 51 n.18.
Id. at 48 n.13 (quoting Baker, supra note 186, at 537 (writing in reference to Schwinn)).
Id. at 59; see also discussion supra part II.
572 F.2d 883 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
Id. at 884.
See id.
Id.
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and entered judgment for Eastern Scientific; Wild Heerbrugg appealed. 96
The issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court's then-recent
decision in GTE Sylvania required Wild Heerbrugg's distribution
restrictions to be analyzed under the rule of reason or under a per se
rule.' 97 Eastern Scientific argued that while GTE Sylvania required nonprice restrictions to be analyzed under the rule of reason, it also required
such restrictions to be subject to per se condemnation when combined
with resale price maintenance. 198 Eastern Scientific relied on footnote
eighteen of GTE Sylvania, where the Supreme Court expressly preserved
per se treatment for vertical price restrictions."9 The First Circuit
disagreed and, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Coffin, held that
under the market-based antitrust principles of GTE Sylvania, Wild
Heerbrugg's resale price restrictions were "not the kind that require[d]
per se treatment." 2°°
The First Circuit's decision in Eastern Scientific purported to be a
straightforward application of the general market-based principles of GTE
Sylvania. The court began its analysis from the position that the "entire
thrust of the GTE Sylvania opinion is that 'departure[s] from the rule of
reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect .... ,,201 To the court, this meant that resorting to a per se rule
was justified only if the anticompetitive effect of Wild Heerbrugg's
combination of territorial and resale price restrictions was greater than
that of a pure territorial restriction, which under GTE Sylvania is
analyzed under the rule of reason. The court reasoned that even though
Wild Heerbrugg's distribution restrictions appeared inform to resemble
resale price maintenance, their anticompetitive effect was no greater than
a pure territorial restriction. 2 2 If Wild Heerbrugg's instruments were
competitive at less than list price, Wild Heerbrugg's policy accomplished
no more than restricting dealers to their territories.2" 3 Conversely, if
Wild Heerbrugg's instruments were competitive at higher than list price,
dealers were free to sell outside of their territories at what would be, in

196. Id. (instructing jury that violations were per se unlawful).
197. See id. at 885. The Supreme Court handed down its decision in GTE Sylvania a few days
after the conclusion of the district court proceedings in Eastern Scientific. Id. at 884.
198. Id. at 885.
199. Id.; see GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
200. Eastern Scientific, 572 F.2d at 885.
201. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57).

202. Id.
203. Id. at 885-86.
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essence, a competitive price.2°4 Based on this analysis, the court was
unable to see any "reason based on substantive economic effect why
[Wild Heerbrugg's] similar but less anticompetitive scheme should be
treated differently" than a pure territorial restriction.2" 5 Accordingly, the
court held that under GTE Sylvania Wild Heerbrugg's distribution
restrictions should be analyzed under the rule of reason.20 6
While the court properly interpreted and applied the general
principles of GTE Sylvania, its limitation of GTE Sylvania to just these
principles was entirely result oriented: A reflection on where the GTE
Sylvania analysis should lead when price and non-price restraints occur
together and produce no difference in effect. The Supreme Court's
requirement of "demonstrable economic effect" to justify departure from
the rule of reason by its terms applied only to the realm of vertical nonprice restrictions. The Court expressly preserved the per se illegality of
vertical price restrictions and excluded such restrictions from its general
discussion of market impact and economic effect.20 7 Indeed, this critical
element of GTE Sylvania was the essence of Eastern Scientific's
argument on appeal;20 8 and the First Circuit was painfully aware that
Wild Heerbrugg's minimum resale price policy for extra-territorial sales
constituted a paradigmatic resale price restriction.20 9 The court was
aware, therefore, that under the letter of GTE Sylvania, it should have
condemned outright Wild Heerbrugg's resale price restriction under the
per se rule. The court, however, correctly perceived the paradox in which
it found itself: as a formal matter, Wild Heerbrugg's resale price maintenance scheme was per se unlawful, while as a matter of good sense and
economics its reasonableness ought to have been analyzed under the rule
of reason. After all, it was, in fact, less anticompetitive than a pure
territory restriction. Neither the First Circuit, nor Eastern Scientific, could
justify departure from the rule of reason on substantive market-based
criteria. Indeed, applying the per se rule would have produced the
incomprehensible result of condemning Wild Heerbrugg's less
anticompetitive practice while sparing the more anticompetitive
alternative of a pure territory restriction. In light of this reality, the court
204. See id. at 885-86.

205. Id. at 886.
206. Id.

207. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 197-200.
209. See 572 F.2d at 884. The court observed, "[t]he practice Eastern complains of can best be
described as a policy of territorial restriction enforced by price maintenance restraints." Id.; see also
price restrictions at issue" (emphasis added)).
id at 885 (referring to "[t]he
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did the only rational and equitable thing it could do and effectively
ignored the use of easy labels-as the Supreme Court cautioned in
BMI-and, thus, the price nature of Wild Heerbrugg's distribution
restrictions and with it the per se rule.
The First Circuit's decision to ignore the per se rule and to analyze
Wild Heerbrugg's price restriction under the rule of reason required the
court to justify its decision with an analysis of market impact. To that
end, the court compared Wild Heerbrugg's distribution restriction to a
pure territory restriction and concluded that it produced the same
anticompetitive effect, "but to a lesser degree."2 ' The court's analysis
implicitly made the critical assumption of robust interbrand competition.
Based on this assumption, Wild Heerbrugg's restriction was, in fact, less
anticompetitive than a pure territory restriction. The court's analysis
obscures the fact, however, that without robust interbrand competition,
the anticompetitive effect of Wild Heerbrugg's restriction was equivalent
to a pure resale price maintenance scheme. By assigning exclusive
territories to dealers, Wild Heerbrugg effectively eliminated all intrabrand
price competition within each territory. A dealer enjoying monopoly
power within an exclusive sales territory would have an incentive to
charge a price that maximized its profits, which price is generally above
a competitively set price, and would have been above Wild Heerbrugg's
suggested list price. By allowing limited price competition on extraterritorial sales, Wild Heerbrugg's policy allowed more competition than
there would have been in a monopolistic world of exclusive territories.
Restricting price to no less than list price for these extra-territorial sales,
however, also had the effect of placing a floor under this limited
competition. The result of this limited competition would tend to be
sales at list price. Consequently, in the absence of strong interbrand
competition, there would have been no functional difference between
Wild Heerbrugg's policy and a pure resale price maintenance scheme at
list price. This illustrates that there is no inevitable
difference between
21
restriction.
distribution
"non-price"
and
a "price"
The First Circuit's recognition of the conflict between the sound
market-based antitrust principles of GTE Sylvania and the per se rule
highlights the fundamental question of whether the per se rule is an
appropriate rule of decision for vertical price restrictions. It is a settled

210. See id. at 886; see also supra text accompanying notes 201-09.
211. See Posner, supra note 117, 8-9 ("[The] distinction between price and nonprice restrictions
is indefensible.").
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matter that section 1 of the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit only
unreasonable restraints of trade.212 Per se rules are used to condemn
outright only the most perniciously anticompetitive trade restrictions that
may be conclusively presumed to impose an unreasonable restraint on
competition.2 13 The First Circuit understood the Supreme Court's
preservation of the per se rule against vertical price restrictions to rest on
the underlying assumption that vertical price restrictions, as a rule, are
more anticompetitive than vertical non-price restrictions. By showing that
Wild Heerbrugg's combination of territory and resale price restrictions
produced the same or less anticompetitive effect than a pure territory
restriction, the court revealed that this underlying assumption supporting
the per se rule was erroneous. It was clear to the First Circuit that
without the support of this assumption, a conclusive presumption of
unreasonable anticompetitive effect was unwarranted and, consequently,
the per se rule was unjustified. It would have been both irrational and
inequitable, notwithstanding the letter of the law, to apply the per se rule
to Wild Heerbrugg's less anticompetitive restriction while analyzing a
more anticompetitive alternative under the rule of reason. To remain
faithful to the sound market-based antitrust principles of GTE Sylvania,
therefore, the court was forced to ignore the formal price nature of Wild
Heerbrugg's distribution restriction, and with it the per se rule, and to
analyze an explicit resale price restriction under the rule of reason.
The fact that the application of the per se rule to vertical price
restraints is inconsistent with the general market-based antitrust principles
of GTE Sylvania and that its application can produce results entirely at
odds with those principles, has prompted a fair amount of judgmentdriven avoidance of the per se rule in the lower courts, of which the First
Circuit's decision in Eastern Scientific is only the first example. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Jack Walters & Sons Corp.
v. Morton Building., Inc.,214 is a vivid example of the lengths to which
a court will go to avoid the per se rule. The defendant, Morton Building,
Inc., was a manufacturer of prefabricated farm buildings. 2 1 Several
times each year Morton would advertise to the public special discount
prices for its buildings. Morton took various steps to see that its dealers
sold its products at no more than their advertised prices, including

212. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,723, cert.denied, 486
U.S. 1005 (1988).
213. See id.; see also supra part II.
214. 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
215. Id. at 701.
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threatening dealers with termination if they went above these prices,
offering to sell directly to the public at the advertised prices, and
checking up on the dealers to see whether they were charging more. In
addition, Morton also gave its dealers a discount from its regular
wholesale prices to make it easier for them to offer Morton products to
consumers at their advertised discount prices. z 6 The plaintiff, Jack
Walters & Sons, was a franchised dealer of Morton's prefabricated farm
buildings with an exclusive sales territory.217 Jack Walters brought suit
against Morton under section 1 of the Sherman Act alleging, inter alia,
that Morton's attempts to force its dealers to comply with the advertised
discount prices constituted unlawful vertical price fixing. The district
court granted Morton's motion for summary judgment and Jack Walters
appealed.21 ' The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment
and held that Morton's restrictive practices did not constitute unlawful
price fixing.219
The Seventh Circuit addressed Jack Walters's allegations of price
fixing on two levels. First, the court asked whether Morton's enforcement
of a maximum price policy violated the per se rule against vertical price
fixing.221 Recall that in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,22 1 the Supreme Court
had applied the per se rule of Dr.Miles to a scheme of maximum price
fixing in the context of exclusive territories. 21 In Jack Walters, however, the Seventh Circuit expressed doubt as to the continued vitality of
Albrecht after the Supreme Court held in GTE Sylvania that exclusive
territories were no longer per se unlawful.' The court reasoned that
if exclusive territories were now lawful when reasonable, it may also be
lawful in some cases for a manufacturer to impose a price ceiling
intended to limit a dealer's market power within its territory. 224 Like
the First Circuit in Eastern Scientific, the Seventh Circuit focused on

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 707-08.
220. Id. at 706.
221. 390 U.S. 145 (1968); see also supra text accompanying notes 65-91.
222. See 390 U.S. at 152-53.
223. 737 F.2d at 706.
224. Id. In support of its interpretation of GTE Sylvania, the Court cited the First Circuit's
decision in Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883, 885-86 (1978),
discussed supra in text accompanying notes 192-211, and Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case:
Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16 n.59 (1978).
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actual anticompetitive effect and ignored the formal price character of
Morton's restrictive practice.22
The second and more critical issue analyzed by the court, upon
which it ultimately based its decision, was whether Morton's maximum
price fixing was properly characterized as "price fixing" in the first
place.226 In answering this question, the court engaged in some very
tortured reasoning to re-characterize Morton's conduct as something other
than price fixing. The court began its analysis from the universal premise
that it was perfectly lawful for a manufacturer to advertise its products
to the ultimate consumer and to mention a retail price in its advertising.
The court reasoned that, since consumer "demand for a manufacturer's
product depends significantly on its retail price," a "manufacturer has a
vital interest in the retail price." 7 Even Jack Walters conceded that
this vital interest was great enough to allow a manufacturer to advertise
a retail price. 228 To the court, it followed naturally that if it was lawful
to advertise a retail price, it ought to be lawful to take at least "the
minimum steps" necessary to protect the integrity of such advertising.2 9 In other words, if a manufacturer could advertise a discount
price, it could also take steps to ensure that this price was not exceeded,
which would otherwise undermine its advertising. In the court's view,
"[tihese [minimum steps] include[d] trying to persuade dealers to adhere
to the advertised price and checking around to make sure [that] they
'
This, of course, was precisely the manner in which
[were] adhering."23
Morton was alleged to have violated the Sherman Act. The court,
however, re-characterized Morton's conduct as "the minimum steps" it
had to take if its advertising was to have any value at all, and, consequently, it was lawful.23t The negative implication of the court's recharacterization, of course, was that Morton's conduct was not properly
characterized as "price fixing" within the meaning of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.

225. The court ultimately declined to base its decision on this analysis, however, because the
legality of Morton's exclusive territories had not been decided by the district court. See 737 F.2d at

707. Rather, the court raised the point only to set forth its view that the legal status of maximum
price fixing under section 1 of the Sherman Act was "an open question after [GTE] Sylvania." Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 708.
230. Id.

231. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit's clever avoidance of the per se rule in Jack
Walters is a vivid example of judicial ingenuity. Concededly, a
manufacturer has a "vital interest" in the retail price of its products, and
has the right to advertise a retail price for its products. Indeed, such
advertising is a form of constitutionally protected speech.232 It does not
follow, necessarily, that this so-called "vital interest" vests a manufacturer with any right to protect its advertising free of the restrictions imposed
by the Sherman Act. Morton's advertisement of special discount prices,
at most, should have been treated as the announcement of a price policy.
It is a settled matter of antitrust law that a manufacturer may unilaterally
enforce an announced price policy.233 At the time that Jack Walters
was before the Seventh Circuit, unilateral action in the resale price
maintenance context was confined to no more than a simple announcement of policy and termination of non-complying dealers.234 Under this
doctrine, if a seller goes beyond announcing a price policy and refusing
to deal with non-complying dealers, it has conspired within the meaning
of section 1 of the Sherman Act with any dealer who complies.235
Accordingly, Morton would have been allowed to advertise its special
discount retail prices to consumers and to refuse to sell its products to
dealers who refused to observe its advertised price. Morton's actual
conduct, however, clearly went past this limit. Jack Walters's affidavits,
accepted as true by the court for purposes of reviewing the district
court's grant of summary judgment, "indicated that Morton... used
[both] persuasion and policing to obtain.., compliance," and that some
of Morton's dealers did, in fact, comply.236 Jack Walters was able to
show concerted action within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman
Act to fix resale prices. 237 Consequently, if pure application of antitrust
jurisprudence were the test, the court should have condemned Morton's
resale price restriction as a matter of law under the per se rule.

232. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748

(1976).
233. See Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 707 ('[W]ithout agreement there can be no violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act."); see also supra text accompanying notes 22-29.
234. Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 707 (citing United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960)).
235. Id.
236. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 216.
237. The district court dismissed Jack Walters's price fixing claim for lack of actual

"agreement," but the Seventh Circuit rejected this ground of dismissal as a clear mistake of law. See
Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 707.
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The court was determined, however, to avoid the perse rule because
it felt that Morton's resale price restriction was reasonable under the
circumstances. Offering discounts was clearly a benefit to consumers.
Moreover, the fact that Morton's dealers received the advertised goods
from Morton at a correspondingly discounted wholesale price made Jack
Walters's complaint ring somewhat hollow to the court.238 Jack Walters
was essentially complaining that Morton was forcing it to pass along
earmarked savings to consumers, instead of allowing dealers to realize
greater profits. Morton's policing tactics were simply the most effective
means of ensuring that its promotional discounts were passed along to
their intended beneficiaries. In any event, Morton's conduct could hardly
be labeled "perniciously anticompetitive" so as to warrant per se
condemnation. A price fixing label, of course, is indifferent to such
arguments, so the court had to find some other justification for affirming
the district court's judgment for Morton. The fortuitous fact that Morton
happened to advertise its periodic discounts provided the court with the
justification for which it was looking. Through its "minimum steps"
analysis, the court was able to re-characterize Morton's conduct as
something other than price fixing. In so re-characterizing Morton's
conduct as "the minimum steps" necessary to protect its advertising, the
court effectively removed from the scope of the Sherman Act conduct
that in reality constituted concerted action to fix resale prices.239
Both Eastern Scientific and Jack Walters are illustrative of
successful ex post judgment-driven avoidance of the per se rule against
vertical price restrictions. The continued existence of the per se rule
against vertical price restraints obviously precluded the possibility of
either court proceeding doctrinally to its desired judgment. As a result,

238. Jack Walters also charged that Morton made it hard for dealers to comply with its
advertised price by giving them a smaller discount from the wholesale price than the difference
between the regular retail price and the advertised price. Id. at 706. The court of appeals was
unmoved by this argument. Id. at 707.
239. The full implication of the court's analysis was that any manufacturer could avoid antitrust
regulation of its pricing practices simply by advertising its prices to the public. Realizing this
unintended implication, the court limited the scope of its analysis by stating that while a
manufacturer may take the minimum steps necessary to prevent its dealers from charging more than
its advertised price, it could not forbid its dealers from charging less than the advertised price. The
court gave no reason for this distinction. See id. at 708. In reality, the court's basis for distinguishing

between forcing compliance with a minimum, as opposed to a maximum, price policy goes back to
the court's comments on Albrecht. See supra text accompanying notes 78-91. The basic notion that
none of Morton's tactics were in the least bit anticompetitive, and that Albrecht's condemnation of
maximum resale price restraints seems particularly anachronistic after GTE Sylvania, is the
underlying subtext that runs throughout the court's analysis of Morton's alleged price fixing.
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neither Eastern Scientific nor Jack Walters offer very much guidance in
terms of standards of behavior safe from per se condemnation. Hostility
towards the per se rule, however, even if universally shared among the
lower courts, is insufficient to produce a uniformly coherent and
reasonably consistent body of case law and counseled business conduct.
In both Eastern Scientific and Jack Walters, the courts possessed the
factual record and the legal flexibility with which to successfully avoid
the per se rule. Unfortunately, not every antitrust case affords a court the
flexibility to review de novo the appropriate rule of law or to apply it to
a unique factual scenario. A narrow procedural posture or sparse facts
can leave a court with little room to avoid, and little choice but to apply,
the per se rule. This creates both inequity and inconsistency that hardly
fosters a rational and efficient economy.
A comparison of Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc.,24 a later
decision of the Seventh Circuit involving resale price maintenance with
Jack Walters, will serve to illustrate this inequity. The plaintiff, Isaksen,
was a discount dealer in wood burning stoves supplied by the defendant,
24 1 Isaksen sold his stoves far below Vermont
Vermont Castings.
Castings's suggested list price, in response to which competing dealers42
bombarded Vermont Castings with complaints of his price-cutting.
There was clear evidence that Isaksen was free-riding on Vermont
Castings's full-service dealers who were losing sales to Isaksen after
providing costly point-of-sale services to customers. As one of Vermont
Castings's dealers explained in a letter, "'The worst disappointment is
spending a great deal of time with a customer only to lose him
to Applewood [Isaksen] because of price .... This letter was precipitated
by the loss of three sales of V.C. stoves today [to] people who[m] we
educated & spent long hours with."'2 43 Beyond this, the evidence in the
case was sharply contested. 2" Isaksen alleged that Vermont Castings
began to harass and threaten him when it found out how low his prices
were.245 Isaksen further alleged that in September of 1982, Vermont
Castings threatened that if he did not raise his prices, Vermont Castings
would mix up his orders.2 6 According to Isaksen, he raised his prices

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

825 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1161-62 (alterations in original).
Id. at 1162.
Id.
Id. at 1162-63.
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in response to this coercion, although a full year had passed between
Vermont Castings's threats and Isaksen's "response," during which time
Vermont Castings never carried out its threats.24 7
Isaksen sued Vermont Castings under section 1 of the Sherman Act
claiming that by coercing him to raise his prices, Vermont Castings
engaged in a per se unlawful conspiracy to maintain resale prices.248
At trial, the jury returned a verdict for Isaksen, but the district court
entered judgment for Vermont Castings on a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.249 Isaksen's appeal to the Seventh Circuit
raised only the narrow issue of whether there was sufficient evidence of
resale price maintenance conspiracy to submit the case to the jury."'
Confined by the procedural posture of the case to reviewing the
sufficiency of Isaksen's evidence in the light most favorable to Isaksen,
the court was unable to conclude that the jury's verdict had no evidentiary basis and reversed the district court's judgment for Vermont Castings.25' The court clearly would have been more satisfied with its
decision had it been able to avoid condemning Vermont Castings under
Isaksen's complaint made "a
the per se rule.252 In its candid view, 253
rather sorry excuse for an antitrust case.,
Had the Seventh Circuit been free to decide both Jack Walters and
Vermont Castings on the basis of market impact, the outcomes would
have been the same. In neither case did the defendants' restrictive
practices restrain competition unreasonably. Both Morton and Vermont
Castings sought to exert some measure of control over their dealers'
resale prices for reasonable and legitimate purposes. Morton sought to
ensure that its dealers actually passed along factory discounts intended
to benefit consumers, a clear boon for consumers and competition alike.
Vermont Castings, as a new company selling a somewhat complex

247. Id. at 1163.
248. Id. at 1161. According to the court, compliance with a price policy procured by threats and
coercion constituted concerted action within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 1163
(citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,

362 U.S. 29, 45 (1960)).
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1163.
It is painfully clear from the court's opinion that the perse rule would have been avoided

if possible. See id. at 1161-62. Despite the fact that its hands were tied, the court invited the district
court, in a manner that can be described only as imploring, to grant Vermont Castings's motion to

set aside the verdict as contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and to order a new trial. Id. at
1163.
253. Id. at 1161.
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product, needed its dealers to provide costly educational and sales efforts
to persuade customers to purchase its product.21 Vermont Castings,
therefore, had a very legitimate reason to seek to protect itself and its
dealers from price-cutting free-riding dealers, such as Isaksen. 2"
Furthermore, Vermont Castings had a very small market share, and it
was difficult for the court to understand how such a small market share
could have been manipulated to have any negative impact on interbrand
competition. 56 The availability of so many substitute products effectively precluded Vermont Castings from exploiting its own intrabrand
market power." 7 Unfortunately, the formalistic per se rule prevented
the Seventh Circuit from deciding either Jack Walters or Vermont
Castings directly on the basis of market impact and competitive
merit.258 The contrary treatment of these two defendants-summary
judgment dismissal for Morton and the refusal to grant judgment
notwithstanding a jury verdict for Vermont Castings-depended entirely
on factual quirk and the inability of the Seventh Circuit to exercise its
ingenuity in Vermont Castings. Upon appeal in Jack Walters, the court
was able to exploit Morton's advertising to re-characterize Morton's
conduct as something other than price fixing.5 9 In Vermont Castings,
however, the court chose not to find a way to question the characterization of Vermont Castings's alleged behavior or find some other way to
avoid the per se rule. 26
The cases discussed thus far reflect the typically negative judicial
attitude towards the per se rule and illustrate the varying degrees of

254. These are precisely the reasons given by the Supreme Court in GTE Sylvania for discarding
the perse rule in the context of non-price distribution restrictions. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977).
255. See Vermont Castings, 825 F.2d at 1161.
256. Id. Vermont Castings had no more than a ten percent localized market share in a market
narrowly defined by the district court as "free-standing woodburning stoves." Id.The Seventh Circuit
questioned with unconcealed bewilderment how this could be a meaningful product-market definition
given the many substitute products such as oil and gas-burning furnaces that it failed to take into
account. Id.
257. Id. The fact that Vermont Castings involved minimum price fixing and Jack Walters
involved maximum price fixing is an insufficient legal basis upon which to distinguish the two cases
since both are regarded technically as per se unlawful under Dr.Miles and Albrecht, respectively.
At most, this difference might have supported different conclusions as to the reasonableness of
Morton's and Vermont Castings's respective behavior. In neither case. however, can unreasonableness be said to be a foregone conclusion sufficient to justify a per se rule.
258. See id. at 1162.
259. Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 708 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
260. 825 F.2d at 1161-62.
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success with which some lower courts have managed to avoid the rule
in the resale price maintenance context. In the dealer-termination
context, 261 the Supreme Court itself has taken an active role in limiting
the scope of the per se rule, thereby encouraging and fostering aggressive
avoidance of the rule in the lower courts. Recall that in Monsanto, the
Supreme Court held that proof that a manufacturer terminated a
plaintiff's dealership following, or even in response to, complaints by
competing dealers, was legally insufficient to support a jury finding of
concerted action.262 Monsanto required a terminated dealer to produce
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer was
acting independently.2" By raising the level of proof required to
establish concerted action, Monsanto effectively protects from per se
condemnation most manufacturers who terminate dealers for pricecutting.2 "4 Similarly, in Business Electronics, the Court narrowed the
definition of price fixing in the context of dealer terminations to
situations where dealers agree to a post-termination price or price
level.265
In McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co.,2 a fairly
unusual pre-Business Electronics case in which a terminated dealer was
able to satisfy Monsanto in the district court, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals managed to reverse a per se judgment by reinterpreting
Monsanto in a way that effectively required the terminated dealer to meet
its heightened evidentiary standard twice. The defendant, La-Z-Boy Chair
Co., was a furniture manufacturer that distributed its products nationwide
in two ways. First, La-Z-Boy sold its products through La-Z-Boy
Showcase Shoppes, which were independently owned and operated retail
outlets that sold La-Z-Boy products exclusively.267 The Showcase
Shoppes were "full service" outlets whose owners agreed to advertise La-

261. The term "dealer termination" refers to the common scenario wherein a terminated
discounting dealer brings suit against the manufacturer under § I of the Sherman Act alleging that
the manufacturer conspired with non-terminated dealers to terminate the aggrieved dealer for the
purpose of maintaining higher resale prices.
262. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
263. Id.
264. For typical examples, see Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House
Group, Inc., 878 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1989), discussed infra at note 290, and Garment Dist., Inc. v.
Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,486 U.S. 1005 (1988), discussed
infra at note 289 and accompanying text.
265. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,735-36, cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1005 (1988).
266. 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
267. Id. at 325.
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Z-Boy products and to provide certain point-of-purchase and repair
services to customers in exchange for a license to use the La-Z-Boy
name. Second, La-Z-Boy sold its products through independent
department stores and retail furniture stores that sold a variety of
furniture brands, and with whom La-Z-Boy had no agreements concerning advertising, point-of-purchase or repair services. 261 La-Z-Boy
suggested retail prices to all of its dealers but made no effort to police
those prices.2 69
The plaintiff, McCabe's Furniture, Inc., was a discount furniture
retailer and one of about a half dozen independent retail furniture stores
selling La-Z-Boy products in Little Rock, Arkansas.270 McCabe's did
not advertise its La-Z-Boy products, or provide any point-of-purchase
services to its La-Z-Boy customers, nor did it offer repair services for the
La-Z-Boy products that it sold.2 7' McCabe's marketing approach,
instead, was to contain overhead costs and pass the savings to consumers
in the form of lower prices.272 In response to frequent and continual
complaints concerning McCabe's from Cyrus Opferman, a Showcase
Shoppe owner in the Little Rock area, La-Z-Boy terminated its relationship with McCabe's Furniture. 273 McCabe's brought suit against La-ZBoy under section 1 of the Sherman Act alleging that La-Z-Boy
conspired with Opferman to maintain the resale price of La-Z-Boy
products, pursuant to which La-Z-Boy terminated McCabe's dealership.274 At trial, the jury returned a verdict for McCabe's upon which
the district court entered judgment over La-Z-Boy's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.27" La-Z-Boy appealed the district court's
denial of its motion, arguing that McCabe's Furniture presented insufficient evidence of a resale price maintenance conspiracy under the
standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Monsanto.2 6 The Eighth
Circuit reversed the district court's denial of La-Z-Boy's motion and,
foreshadowing Business Electronics,held that while McCabe's Furniture
produced sufficient evidence to show that La-Z-Boy and Opferman
conspired to terminate McCabe's dealership, it failed to produce

268. Id.
269. Id. at 326.
270. Id. at 325-26.

271. See id. at 326.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 326-27.
274. Id. at 325.

275. Id. at 327.
276. Id. at 325.
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sufficient evidence to show that they terminated McCabe's dealership
pursuant to a conspiracy to maintain the price of La-Z-Boy products in
the Little Rock market. 77
The Eighth Circuit divided into two steps its analysis of whether
McCabe's Furniture presented enough evidence to satisfy Monsanto. The
first step in the Court's analysis asked whether McCabe's produced
sufficient evidence under Monsanto to prove that La-Z-Boy conspired
with Opferman to terminate McCabe's dealership. 8 At trial, Opferman
testified that he complained to La-Z-Boy that McCabe's was free-riding
on his various promotional expenditures and efforts, that McCabe's prices
were too low and were cutting into his sales and that McCabe's display
of La-Z-Boy products tarnished their quality image which much of his
expenditures and efforts were designed to maintain 7 9 While these
complaints alone could not establish concerted action under
Monsanto,2"' there was also evidence that Opferman personally escorted a La-Z-Boy sales manager to inspect McCabe's store and that La-ZBoy was concerned with giving Opferman "every break possible", as
28 After McCabe's
well as with helping him "make a decent profit.""
termination, La-Z-Boy personnel reported to Opferman that "[the]
problem had been taken care of." 82 After reviewing the evidence, the
circuit court concluded that McCabe's Furniture had produced sufficient
evidence under Monsanto to support the jury's determination that La-ZBoy and Opferman conspired to terminate McCabe's dealership.283
In the court's view, however, this evidence of conspiracy between
La-Z-Boy and Opferman to terminate McCabe's did not settle the second
issue of whether their conspiracy was designed to achieve an illegal price
fixing purpose. Under the court's interpretation of Monsanto, the required
showing of purpose turned on the motives of the conspirators: Whether
La-Z-Boy and Opferman conspired to terminate McCabe's dealership
intending to affect price competition or non-price competition. Analyzing
the sufficiency of McCabe's evidence in this regard, the court found that
La-Z-Boy presented substantial evidence that its concern with McCabe's
stemmed not from low prices, but from failure to merchandise the La-Z-

277. Id.
278. See id. at 328-29.

279. Id. at 326.
280. Id. at 328.
281. Id. at 326.
282. Id. at 327.
283. Id. at 328-29.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

47

Hofstra
Law Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1996],[Vol.
Art. 24:1069
3
HOFSTRA
LAW REVIEW

Boy product in a manner consistent with the high quality image that LaZ-Boy sought to project on a national scale. La-Z-Boy was concerned
that McCabe's "'low end store' would discourage higher quality retailers
in Little Rock from carrying La-Z-Boy" products.2 4 The court reasoned that this evidence, coupled with evidence of Opferman's like
concern that McCabe's was tarnishing the La-Z-Boy image, showed that
it was just as reasonable to conclude that La-Z-Boy and Opferman
conspired intending to affect the marketing image of La-Z-Boy products,
a non-price concern, as it was to conclude that they conspired intending
to affect price competition.25 The court concluded that since both
conclusions were equally plausible, the evidence was too "'ambiguous"'
under Monsanto for a reasonable jury to find that La-Z-Boy and
Opferman formed a resale price maintenance conspiracy pursuant to
which McCabe's dealership was terminated.2 86
The Eighth Circuit's motive test focused on both La-Z-Boy and
Opferman.287 However, a dealer's motive in complaining to a manufacturer generally should not be at issue, and for at least two reasons: First,
typically, only the manufacturer is a party defendant, not the nonterminated dealer. Second, the Eighth Circuit's observation notwithstanding, a dealer's motive when complaining about a price-cutting competitor
is obvious, namely, the price-cutter's low prices. Moreover, it was only
through a strained interpretation of the facts, and a vast amount of
appellate fact-finding-a province typically reserved to the jury--that the
court was able to devise a non-price concern from Opferman's complaints. 288 The critical inquiry for purposes of establishing the nature of

284. Id. at 329 (citing internal memorandum).
285. Id. at 330.
286. Id. at 330-31 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984)).
287. Id. at 329-30.
288. The court stated that the evidence demonstrated that La-Z-Boy and Opferman were
motivated by both marketing and price concerns. Id. at 330. In reality, however, only La-Z-Boy
could show a legitimate non-price concern with its marketing image. Opferman, on the other hand,
was concerned primarily with the fact that he was losing sales to McCabe's due to McCabe's pricecutting. Any concern of Opferman's regarding La-Z-Boy's tarnished marketing image stemmed from
his overall concern with McCabe's price-cutting. The simple business reality is that a full-service
retailer is concerned with the marketing image of the products he sells primarily to the extent that
such image justifies his pricing structure, and in this regard, services are a function of price structure.
In other words, Opferman was concerned with La-Z-Boy's high quality image only to the extent that
such image justified his relatively high retail prices and services. There is no other rational reason
for Opferman to care about La-Z-Boy's image. Thus, Opferman's concerns with McCabe's could
not reasonably be characterized as anything other than price concerns. Even La-Z-Boy understood
Opferman's complaints to express pure price concerns. See id. at 326 (explaining that, in immediate
response to Opferman's complaints, La-Z-Boy's Arkansas factory manager was instructed to look
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the concerted action ought to focus on the manufacturer's motive for
terminating the price-cutter and on the competitive effect of that
termination. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in
Garment District,Inc. v. Belk Stores Services, Inc., "the critical element
in the Monsanto analysis is not what motivates the distributors to
complain, but rather what motivates the manufacturer to terminate
discounters in response to these complaints."289
The question that arises after examining the Eighth Circuit's
construction of Monsanto is why the court felt it had to go to all of the
trouble in the first place. It would have been far more expedient to
reverse the district court's judgment for plaintiff's failure to show
concerted action altogether. The Eighth Circuit obviously was concerned
that McCabe's had offered a great deal of evidence showing that La-ZBoy and Opferman's actions were intertwined, perhaps too much
evidence for the court to have reversed the district court's judgment for
failure to show concerted action under Monsanto.2 ° On the other hand,
the court felt that manufacturers ought to be able to choose freely who
may market their products and was convinced that dealer-terminations
ought not to be subject to the per se rule even if motivated by price
concerns. The court's interpretation of Monsanto, through which it
imposed upon McCabe's an additional burden of proof, gave the court
a plausible basis upon which to dismiss McCabe's complaint when the
evidence otherwise established concerted action. Specifically, the court's
motive test took advantage of the fact that both La-Z-Boy and Opferman
expressed concern with the marketing image of La-Z-Boy products.29,
According to the court, any concerted action rooted in this ostensibly
"6non-price" concern could not be labeled a "price" conspiracy, and could
not be subject to the per se rule. Seizing on this fact, the court was able
to characterize the totality of evidence as "'highly ambiguous"' and
therefore legally insufficient to satisfy Monsanto.292
carefully at distribution in Little Rock to make sure that Opferman could "make a decent profit" on

its product line).
289. 799 F.2d 905, 910 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
290. See Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 878 F.2d

801, 806 n.4 (4th Cir. 1989) (rejecting explicitly the Eighth Circuit's finding of concerted action in
McCabe's Furnitureand its construction of Monsanto); see also discussion infra note 292.
291. See, e.g., McCabe's Furniture,798 F.2d at 329.

292. Id. at 330 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984)).
We have not challenged the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence showing
that La-Z-Boy and Opferman's actions were intertwined to dismiss the case for failure to show
concerted action. See supra text accompanying notes 279-83. In Parkway Gallery Furniture,

however, the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the Eighth Circuit's finding of concerted action in
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Underlying McCabe " Furniturewas the issue whether an agreement
between a manufacturer and dealer to terminate a second dealer for pricecutting ought to be per se unlawful. By interpreting Monsanto and the
concerted action requirement to avoid the per se rule, the Eighth Circuit
effectively answered this question in the negative. The same question
came before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,293 where the court also effectively
held that such an agreement ought not to be per se unlawful. The Fifth
Circuit avoided the per se rule by distorting the definition of a "price"
restriction.2 94 Two years later, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Business Electronics,and held, like the Fifth Circuit,
that an agreement to terminate a price-cutting dealer is not per se
unlawful unless the manufacturer and non-terminated dealers also agree
on a post-termination resale price or price level.29 5 However, an
agreement on post-termination resale prices, express or implied, is quite
rare. Moreover, the existence of such an agreement would be quite
difficult for a terminated dealer to prove. So in restricting the range of
distribution restrictions treated as "price" restrictions and subject to the
perse rule, Business Electronics effectively neutralizes the per se rule in
the dealer-termination context. Naturally, this restriction of the per se
rule has been received warmly in the lower courts. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Center Video Industrial Co. v. United
Media, Inc.,z9 fairly reflects this warm reception and illustrates how
Business Electronics effectively precludes a terminated dealer from
establishing a per se claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
In Center Video, the defendant, United Media, Inc., manufactured
commercial quality video tape editing equipment and distributed it
nationally through a network of full-service and discount dealers.297

McCabe'sFurniture.See 878 F.2d at 806 nA. In its view, the evidence upon which McCabe's relied
to show concerted action did not tend to exclude the possibility that La-Z-Boy was acting
independently in terminating McCabe's dealership. Id. Rather, the totality of evidence, including the
fact that La-Z-Boy reported to Opferman after terminating McCabe's that the "problem had been
taken care of," McCabe's Furniture, 798 F.2d at 327, only rose to the level of being "arguably
consistent with the possibility of a conspiracy." Parkway Gallery Furniture, 878 F.2d at 806 n.4.
293. 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 485 U.S. 717, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
Certiorari was pending in this case when the Eighth Circuit rendered its decision in McCabe's Furniture. 798 F.2d at 329.
294. 780 F.2d at 1218.
295. 485 U.S. at 735-36.
296. 995 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1993) (Engel, J., Senior Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, sitting by designation and writing for the court).
297. Id. at 735.
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Discount Video, Walt Davis Enterprises, and the plaintiff Center Video
Industrial Co. were three discount dealers of United Media products.298
In April of 1990, Discount Video complained to United Media about
price competition from Center Video, claiming that Center Video was
undercutting Discount Video's prices. The following month, Discount
Video suspended sales of United Media equipment in order to pressure
United Media into taking effective action concerning Center Video's
prices. 299 After unsuccessfully urging Center Video to raise its prices,
United Media terminated Center Video's dealership. 3" Within a week
of this termination, Discount Video resumed purchase and sales of United
Media equipment. 30'
Center Video sued United Media under section 1 of the Sherman
Act alleging that United Media terminated Center Video's dealership
pursuant to a resale price maintenance conspiracy with Discount
Video.3" 2 Center Video did not allege, however, that United Media and
Discount Video agreed on a post-termination resale price or price
level.30 3 Relying on Business Electronics, the district court entered
summary judgment for United Media and Center Video appealed." 4 In
a straightforward analysis of Center Video's claim under Business
Electronics, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's summary
judgment grant for United Media.30 5 The court found, after measuring
the facts established by Center Video against the standard of Business
Electronics,that Center Video failed to set forth facts that would tend to
show the existence of an agreement between United Media and Discount
Video to set a post-termination resale price or price level.30 6
Center Video vividly illustrates how Business Electronics has
trivialized the per se rule against resale price maintenance in the dealertermination context. Under current law, United Media's combination with

298. Id. at 736.

299. See id.
300. Id. United Media also terminated its relationship with Walt Davis at that time. Id. at 736

n.2.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See id. at 739.
304. Id. at 736. Center Video made much in its appeal of the district court's seeming
requirement of an agreement to set a specific price, which is more stringent than Business
Electronics' requirement of an agreement to set a price or price level. Finding that Center Video
failed to allege facts that would tend to prove agreement on either a specific price or price level, the
Seventh Circuit found this to be harmless error under FED. R. Civ. P. 61. Id. at 739.
305. Id. at 739.
306. Id. at 736, 739.
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Discount Video is no longer treated as a resale price maintenance
conspiracy. Yet United Media terminated Center Video's dealership
intending to affect nothing other than the maintenance of Discount
Video's resale prices. Indeed, following Center Video's termination,
"[w]hen Discount Video resumed sales of United Media products, the
prices it charged.., were higher than the prices that it was charging
while in competition with Center Video. 30 7 For example, while
Discount Video previously sold United Media's UM430 basic edit
controller at prices ranging from $2,730 to $3,007 per unit, its prices for
the same unit after United Media terminated Center Video ranged from
$3,068 to $3,479 per unit.30 ' Hence, it defies logic to label any agreement between United Media and Discount Video a "non-price" conspiracy.
However, the Seventh Circuit explained in the course of its analysis
that underlying Business Electronics' narrow definition of "price"
conspiracy is the recognition that agreements meant to terminate pricecutters do not have the requisite "demonstrable economic effect" to
justify departure from the rule of reason."° This is so because in the
absence of market power, interbrand competition ensures that any given
manufacturer's retail sales price does not rise above the competitive
level.310 The same reasoning supported the Supreme Court's decision
in GTE Sylvania to overrule Schwinn and hold that all vertical non-price
restrictions should be analyzed under the rule of reason." The Supreme Court thus recognized in Business Electronics that agreements to
terminate price-cutting dealers are subject to the same competitive market
forces as other distribution restrictions. This, alone, should have been
sufficient reason to overturn the per se rule altogether instead of
artificially restricting the category of practices subject to its draconian

307. Id. at 736.
308. Id.

309. Id. at 737 (citing Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988)).
310. Id.The Seventh Circuit noted the fact that the prices charged by Discount Video for United
Media equipment following the termination of Center Video's dealership were generally higher than
its pre-termination prices. Id. at 736; see supra text accompanying notes 300-09. This does not
undermine the assertion that interbrand competition will ensure that prices do not rise above the
competitive level. Discount Video was the only remaining discount dealer of United Media
equipment. Prices for United Media equipment from full-service dealers were higher than the prices
charged by Discount Video both before and after United Media terminated Center Video's
dealership. This, of course, raises the possibility of a free-rider problem; however, there is no
indication that there was such a problem, probably because Discount Video was a wholly owned
subsidiary of a full-service dealer. 995 F.2d at 736 n.1.
311. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
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condemnation. Indeed, there is no substantive market-based reason to
distinguish the anticompetitive effect of an agreement to terminate a
price-cutting dealer to remove the effects of his price cutting on other
dealers from an identical agreement coupled with an agreement on a
post-termination resale price. In both situations, the prices set by the
continuing dealers will rise after termination of the price-cutting dealer.
Additionally, the price increase in both cases will be subject to the
market forces of interbrand competition. Consumers will substitute
competing brands of the same product for an overpriced brand, regardless
of whether that price is set by a dealer alone or through an agreement
between a dealer and manufacturer.
The Seventh Circuit in Center Video further explained, however,
that according to the Supreme Court, the alleged tendency of resale price
maintenance to facilitate the formation of horizontal cartels justified
preserving its per se unlawful status in certain circumstances. 1 2 The
Seventh Circuit proffered two ways in which resale price maintenance
could be exploited to facilitate the formation of horizontal cartels. First,
at the retail level, competing retailers who desire to form a cartel will
turn to the manufacturer for assistance in policing their cartel against
wayward members. The retailers inform the manufacturer that unless it
imposes resale price restrictions on all of the prospective cartel members,
they will stop purchasing its products. This way, the retailers can foist
resale price maintenance agreements onto manufacturers as a centralized
mechanism of policing their own cartel. Aper se rule against resale price
maintenance 1thus
denies potential retail-level cartels of an enforcement
3
mechanism.
That concern does not require that vertical price restraints be subject
to a per se rule. Such concerted pressure by retailers is horizontal price
fixing under General Motors.3 14 Thus, the per se prohibition of resale
price maintenance cannot be justified on that basis.
The second concern raised by the circuit court was that, at the
manufacturer level, manufacturers may also wish to enter into agreements
with one another governing the prices that they charge their dealers.
These prospective cartel members also lack an effective enforcement

312. 995 F.2d at 737.
313. See id. (citing Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 725-26; GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51

n. 18). Of course, the defendant in a vertical price fixing claim in this scenario would be the helpless
and coerced manufacturer, which leads one to question whether a per se rule against vertical price
restrictions is an equitable way to police against the formation of horizontal retail cartels. See id.
314. United States v. GeneralMotors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 140-41, 145-46 (1966).
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mechanism since information concerning the prices that they themselves
charge is not typically available to the public. By agreeing to impose
resale price restrictions on their dealers and retailers, the manufacturers
need only monitor the prices of their partners' dealers. Deviation from
any given retail price would indicate that a member of the cartel was
underselling the agreed upon cartel price. Accordingly, a per se rule15
denies these potential cartel members of an enforcement mechanism.
Once again, however, a horizontal agreement is present; thus, a per se
rule against vertical price restraints is unnecessary to achieve per se
condemnation.
In any event, Judge Engel, writing for the court in Center ideo,
went out of his way to show that there is no economic reason to believe
that resale price maintenance facilitates a retail-level or manufacturerlevel cartel.316 First, for the retailers' scheme to be successful, it must
be industry-wide, including not only all the retailers of a given
manufacturer's products, but all manufacturers of competing products, as
well. Otherwise, interbrand competition would foil the cartel members'
plans to raise prices above the competitive level by driving customers to
the substitutable products of competing manufacturers.317 Second, there
must be barriers to entry at the retail level. Otherwise, any manufacturer
unwilling to cooperate with the colluding retailers will simply find other
retailers to sell its products.31 8 In short, any industry-wide retail-level
cartel extensive enough to be successful will be readily identifiable, and
thus can be easily and effectively attacked directly as a per se illegal
horizontal agreement without subjecting resale price maintenance to per
se condemnation." 9
Similarly, prohibiting resale price maintenance is unnecessary to
prevent a manufacturer-level cartel.320 First, as in the case of the retail-

315. See Center Video Indus., 995 F.2d at 738 (citing Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 724;
GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18).
316. Id. at 737-38 n.4-5.
317. Id. at n.4 (citing Tyler A. Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in
the Section One Labyrinth:Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REV. 1457, 1489 (1981); Jean W.
Burns, The New Role of Coercion in Antitrust, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 397 (1991)).
318. Id. (citing Baker, supra note 317, at 1489; Bums, supra note 317, at 397; Frank H.
Easterbrook, VerticalArrangementsand the Rule ofReason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 141-43 (1984)).
319. Id. (citing Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp Dealing: The Horizontal/VerticalDichotomy in
DistributorTermination Cases, 38 EMORY L.J. 311, 318 n.27 (1989)). Horizontal price fixing is
"perhaps the paradigm of an unreasonable restraint of trade" and is, therefore, per se unlawful. See
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984), discussed supra in text accompanying notes
140-54.
320. See Center Video, 995 F.2d at 738 n.5.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss4/3

54

1996]

TO REASON
SacksRETURN
and Silvera:
A Return to Reason for Price Restraints

level cartel, success depends upon the industry-wide participation of
virtually all manufacturers of a given product and on barriers to entry in
the relevant industry.32' In addition, as with retail-level cartels, any
manufacturer-level cartel pervasive enough to be successful will be
readily identifiable, and thus can be attacked directly as a per se illegal
horizontal agreement. 3"
In Business Electronics,the Supreme Court ruled that an agreement
between a manufacturer and a dealer to terminate a second dealer for
price-cutting does not have the requisite pernicious anticompetitive effect
in all circumstances to justify departure from the rule of reason. The
Court fell one step short of overturning the per se rule, however, and
justified its decision to preserve the per se rule with a highly tenuous
theory connecting resale price maintenance to the formation of horizontal
cartels. In Center Video, the Seventh Circuit went out of its way to show
that this tenuous theoretical justification is completely without merit.
Business Electronics and Center Video thus reinforce the notion that
there is no longer any need for a per se rule in the dealer-termination
context.
The cases analyzed above reflect a consistent judicial preference for
the analytic rule of reason over the formalistic per se rule when
reviewing vertical price restrictions under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Indeed, the past decade and a half of jurisprudence in this area, from
GTE Sylvania to Business Electronics,in both the Supreme Court and the
lower courts, is characterized by an ever increasing determination to
avoid the per se rule. In the post-GTE Sylvania cases, courts have often
exercised their ingenuity and creativity to avoid the per se rule. This sort
of judgment-driven expost avoidance of the per se rule, while producing
more equitable and rational decisions, breeds a great deal of ex ante
ambiguity and uncertainty in the antitrust law concerning distribution
restrictions. This leaves market participants, and their counselors, with
precious little certainty, comfort or consistency in a crucial area of
business activity. Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court has stopped
unjustifiably one step short of overturning the per se rule unfortunately
forces manufacturers and distributors to pursue their legitimate business
objectives circuitously and inefficiently through so-called non-price
restrictions, rather than through a price restriction, which would produce

321.

Id. (citing William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L.

REV. 933, 942 (1987)).
322. Id. (citing Bums, supra note 317, at 395).
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the same competitive result more directly and efficiently. In the final
section, we will examine case histories of two market participants who
were burdened in their efforts to market their products while avoiding the
pitfall of per se condemnation.
IV.

CASE HISTORIES

Consider the following two actual case histories. A supplier had a
history of pressuring its dealers not to discount its products at retail. It
did not have a formal resale price maintenance policy, and the enforcement of its informal policy varied. It desired to formalize its nondiscounting policy because it believed that the sale of its product at
discount stores and at a discount was totally contrary to its brand image
as a premium product. It believed that the best way to protect the
goodwill in its trademark and name was to stop selling to discounters.
Unfortunately, under existing case law, terminating discounters was
a course of action fraught with risks of per se condemnation. The past
practice of pressuring dealers to ease discounting created the likelihood
that any termination of a discounter would be challenged as per se
unlawful under Parke, Davis; Beech-Nut; and Albrecht. Therefore, the
supplier examined other ways to reach the same result. It conducted a
two-year study to come up with customer selection criteria that all
dealers would be required to meet in the future to qualify as a dealer.
The criteria that was developed had nothing to do with resale prices, but
rather focused on product display and presentation. The program was
implemented through a series of complicated contracts and dealer criteria,
all of which were monitored by dealer questionnaires and the supplier's
sales force. Numerous dealers were terminated for failure to revise their
practices to meet the new dealer criteria.
Although the program was successfully implemented, it would have
been far more efficient for the supplier merely to have terminated the
discounters without going through a two-year delay and the facade (and
reality) of new dealer selection criteria. Simply put, the supplier should
not have been required to jump through hoops to implement what it
believed to be a resale price policy that would enhance the goodwill of
its brand and, therefore, be procompetitive in the arena of interbrand
competition. If vertical price restraints were subject to the rule of reason,
the supplier could have avoided the inefficiency of the two-year delay
and using dealer-selection criteria as a proxy for a price policy without
the risk of per se condemnation.
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A similar episode involves the manufacturer of products sold
through dealers, specialty stores and department stores. The manufacturer
wants to avoid discounting and price gouging by its retailers. It wants to
do so for several reasons. First, there is an after-sale market for the
products in which the products sell at far above suggested retail because
they are viewed as collectibles. The manufacturer believes that it would
hurt goodwill and depress the after-sale market if the products were
discounted at retail. Moreover, the manufacturer believes that sales above
suggested retail by retailers would be viewed by collectors as an effort
by retailers to capitalize on the after-sale market developed by collectors.
This would again harm the goodwill and brand image of the manufacturer and its products. The manufacturer wants to institute a resale price
maintenance policy, but has deferred doing so because of the risk that
enforcement of such a policy would lead to per se condemnation.
Eventually, after crafting a policy that attempted to strictly comply with
Colgate, the manufacturer went forward with a resale price maintenance
policy.
The point of these two examples is to recognize that there are
numerous situations where manufacturers and suppliers believe that it is
procompetitive to interbrand competition to engage in vertical price
restraints, because to do so would increase goodwill and the strength of
the brand. And those procompetitive virtues do not arise only in the area
where manufacturers and suppliers are concerned with the free-rider
problem.
V.

CONCLUSION

As we have shown, there is a great deal of doctrinal confusion and
inconsistency in the treatment of vertical restraints of trade. The reality
is that most vertical restraints have legitimate procompetitive virtues as
well as anticompetitive effects (at least on intrabrand competition). The
current state of the law is that (1) vertical non-price restraints are
governed by the rule of reason; (2) vertical price restraints are narrowly
defined in the dealer complaints area to situations where the nonterminated dealer agrees to a price or price level; and (3) the precise
contours of the level of proof required to establish concerted action in the
area of resale price maintenance policies is, at best, unclear under
Colgate, Albrecht, and Monsanto.
This creates a vexing problem for suppliers who believe that vertical
restraints are useful business tools. Consequently, it is not just a problem
for suppliers who are concerned about a free-rider problem. It is also a
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recurring problem with manufacturers and suppliers who believe that the
value of their brand image is impacted by the sale of their products at
discount stores. The current state of the law governing vertical price
restraints makes little sense. It is long past the time when the Supreme
Court should clarify the law and hold that all vertical restraints challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act will be analyzed under the
rule of reason.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss4/3

58

